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"FOR THE MISDEMEANOR OuTLAW": THE IMPACT OF THE
ADA ON THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS wrrH MENTAL DISABILITIES
Michael L. Perlin*
Notwithstanding widespread statutory and judicial endorsement of
the "least restrictive alternative" ("LRA") or "least intrusive means"
principle,1 certain classes of persons with mental disabilities-criminal
defendants awaiting incompetency-to-stand-trial evaluations, criminal
defendants found permanently incompetent to stand trial under Jackson
v. Indiana,2 criminal defendants awaiting insanity evaluations, and
criminal defendants institutionalized following a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity ("NGRI")-are frequently institutionalized in maxi-
mum security forensic institutions whether or not they (1) were arrested
for violent crimes, (2) pose a significant threat of danger to the commu-
nity, or (3) are seriously mentally ill. In some jurisdictions, this policy is
statutory; in others, it is the result of case law; in still others, it is cus-
tomary.
Commentators have criticized these policies as therapeutically coun-
terproductive and cost-inefficient.3 For years these criticisms have been
uniformly ignored; in fact, many jurisdictions have instead adopted rules
that mandate greater security and make it less possible-virtually im-
possible in some instances-for certain categories of patients (e.g., in-
sanity acquittees) to ever be treated in less than the most restrictive en-
Professor of Law, New York Law School. A-B., Rutgers University, J.D., Columbia Uni-
versity Law School. The author wishes to thank Jenna Anderson for her excellent research assis-
tance and Richard Ciccone, Beth Gordon, Grant Morris, Susan Stefan, Mark Weber, and Bruce
Winick in their incisive and helpful comments. Portions of this Article were also presented at the
Journal Club of College of Rochester, New York (Mar. 27, 2000), the annual conference of the
American College of Forensic Psychiatry at Newport Beach, California (April 1, 2000), and at a
symposium on Dangerousness, Risk, and Mental Illness at the University of Tulsa College of Law
(Ostober 28, 2000).
1. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, I MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL ArD CRmMINAL, § 2C-5.3, at
417-23 (2d ed. 1998).
2. 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972) (finding a violation of the Due Process Clause when an individ-
ual is committed for more than the "'reasonable period of time' necessary to determine whether
there is a substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future").
3. See generally Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 921 (1985).
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vironment, no matter what their level of mental illness or perceived dan-
gerousness and no matter whether the original crime charged was one of
violence. The Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Jones v. United States,4
rejecting arguments that it was unconstitutional to retain insanity acquit-
tees for longer periods of time than the maximum sentence for the un-
derlying crime,5 illuminated the Court's antipathy toward insanity
pleaders in the context of the case of a defendant initially charged with
attempted shoplifting.6 The Court's 1997 decision in Kansas v. Hen-
dricksT--upholding the constitutionality of the most restrictive state-
level "sexually violent predator act"--appeared to add another obstacle
to those seeking to ameliorate their conditions and, on the surface, made
it appear that challenges to such restrictive confinement policies would
be doomed. 9
This scenario must be revisited, however, in light of the passage of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")10 and the potential
application of the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Olmstead v. L C, "
finding a qualified right to community treatment and services for certain
institutionalized persons.12 Olmstead-although not a constitutional de-
cision 3-revitalizes the application of the LRA doctrine to questions
involving the institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities,1
4
and compels us to rethink many of the repressive policies adopted in the
past decade that mandate longer (and more restrictive) terms of con-
finement for many persons with mental disabilities who initially entered
the institutional system through the portal marked "criminal."
In this Article, I will argue that the application of Olmstead and the
ADA to one subset of persons with mental disability-criminal defen-
dants charged with misdemeanors and certain non-violent felonies-
forces the abandonment of many of the policies to which I have already
referred. I believe that, after Olmstead, policies that mandate that all
defendants awaiting incompetence and insanity evaluations, all defen-
dants found permanently incompetent under Jackson, and all NGRI ac-
4. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
5. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.69.
6. Id. at 359.
7. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
8. Hendricks, at 371.
9. Id. at 388-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
11. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
12. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 596. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "I Ain't Gonna Work on
Maggie's Farm No More": Institutional Segregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the
Promise ofOlmstead v. L.C., 17 COOLEY L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
13. The court emphasized this in Olmstead. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587 ("This case, as it
comes to us, presents no constitutional question.").
14. See Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise ": Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate
the Constitutional "Least Restrictive Alternative " Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 Hous.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
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quittees must be evaluated, treated, or confined only in a state's maxi-
mum security facility for the criminally insane violate the ADA. I also
believe that Olmstead-if we take Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion
language seriously--forces us to restructure in many ways how we think
about mentally disabled criminal defendants.
Here, I use the word "we" advisedly, for I am speaking of two very
different universes. The first is the predictable one-where a vast, over-
whelming majority appears to endorse more and more restrictive and
repressive means of institutionalizing persons with mental disabilities
(again, especially those who entered through the door marked "crimi-
nal") and is entirely comfortable with Hendricks and its blurring of the
categories of "civil" and "criminal" confinement.15 The attitudes of this
universe are relatively easy to discern. They are explicated daily on talk
radio shows, in tabloid headlines, and in the pandering of cowardly poli-
ticians. 16 The other universe-far, far tinier-is often nearly invisible,
but is, in many ways, far more interesting. I speak here of the patients'
rights bar and the mental disability advocates who historically have im-
posed a strict orthodoxy of analysis geared to separating out "criminal"
mental health law from "civil" mental health law.17 This is a phenome-
non I have thought about for years. I believe that I am one of very few
law professors who writes about patients' rights issues that began his
career as a public defender. This has been reinforced several times in the
past few months by colleagues who have gotten wind of this project and
have expressed concern about how it might be distorted and manipulated
by the other universe to which I have just referred. This fear-a fear that
application of the ADA to individuals charged with crime will somehow
link images of persons institutionalized following an involuntary civil
commitment and those of persons institutionalized following a criminal
arrest, a fear that I will call "fear of fusion"--is an important one, and,
to the best of my knowledge, has never been openly discussed. I raise it
here because it reinforces in an important way that we can never lose
sight of the corrosive impact of stigma in this entire enterprise.
15. See Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All".
Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1270 (1998).
This blurring contrasts-sadly-with the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Krol,
344 A.2d 289, 297 (N.J. 1975), providing expanded procedural due process rights for insanity
acquittees ("The labels 'criminal commitment' and 'civil commitment' are of no constitutional
significance.").
16. For a flavor of the recent debate in New York City, see, for example, Joel Siegel, Hil Rips
Homeless Sweep/Says Gluliani's Policies "Punish Poverty, " N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 1999, at
2; Streets Aren't Bedrooms, Giuliani Says, As Homeless Targeted, ATLANTA J. & CONST'N, Nov.
21, 1999, at AS; Susan Rabinowitz, Sharpton Rips Giuliani Says Mayor Panders with Homeless
Stance, N.Y. POST, Nov. 28, 1999, at 12; Zoe Heller, Giuliani's Cure for the Homeless: Arrest
Them, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 11, 1999, at 24.
17. Michael L. Perlin, Overview of Rights in the Criminal Process, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF
MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1879, 1891 (Paul R. Friedman ed. 1979).
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I need to emphasize that I do not believe that the arguments I am
making here apply only to defendants accused of misdemeanors and
"minor" felonies. I have argued both in court and in academic literature
that the seriousness of an underlying criminal charge alone is not
enough of a predicate upon which to base maximum security confine-
ment.' s I limit my argument in this Article to misdemeanants and petty
felons, because I believe that, practically speaking, it is a necessary first
step in the integration of the Olmstead doctrine into criminal procedure
law. 19
My Article will proceed in the following manner: First, I will pro-
vide some background on the ways that individuals in the four legal
categories that I have mentioned-those awaiting incompetence evalua-
tions on a misdemeanor or non-violent felony charge, those institutional-
ized following a finding of permanent incompetence (and thus, not tri-
able) under Jackson on similar charges, those being evaluated on the
question of their insanity at the time of their offense, and those found
NGRI on such charges-are treated by the legal system, looking also at
the impressive body of critical literature that has developed in the past
two decades. Next, I will discuss the development of the LRA concept
in mental disability law, with brief forays into the Supreme Court's pre-
Olmstead excursions into LRA law in Youngberg v. Romeo2 and Rig-
gins v. Nevada.2' Then, I will look at the ADA's language, its congres-
sional finding of facts and history, and the relevant supporting Depart-
ment of Justice regulations. After that, I will briefly review the Olm-
stead decision, with particular focus on the ADA as an anti-stigma stat-
ute and its seeming endorsement ("resuscitation" might be a better
choice of word) of the LRA doctrine (a doctrine seemingly left in ashes
after the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Youngberg).22 Next, I will
explain two concepts that are critical to an understanding of any aspect
of mental disability law, especially when we look at the blurring be-
tween "civil" and "criminal" mental disability law-sanism and pretex-
tuality. I will then assess their impact on the subject at hand.23 Following
that, I will briefly discuss the important concept of therapeutic jurispru-
18. See, e.g., State v. Fields, 390 A.2d 574, 580 (N.J. 1978) (insanity acquittees have same
right to periodic review as civil patients); 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2A-4.4b at 133-39 (discussing
importance of Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (commitment criteria same in cases of civil and criminal com-
mitment)). Both Fields and Krol had been charged with murder and were subsequently found not
guilty by reason of insanity.
19. I want to thank Professor Grant Morris for his invaluable insights on this aspect of my
Article.
20. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, §§ 3A-9 to 3A-9.9, at 87-108.
21. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 3B-8.3, at 323-29.
22. See Perlin, supra note 14.
23. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON
TRIAL (2000).
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dence,24 and I will explain why it must be employed as a tool for deci-
phering areas of the law such as the one I am discussing.25 Finally, I will
conclude by showing that typical state policies that mandate the institu-
tionalization of all "forensic patients," including those of the four cate-
gories that are the narrower focus of this Article, in maximum security
settings, and that engage in a strong presumption-perhaps in some
cases an irrebuttable one-that such institutionalization is preferred,
violate the Americans with Disabilities Act as construed by the Supreme
Court in Olmstead. These policies also reflect sanist and pretextual deci-
sion-making and are therapeutically counterproductive.
My title comes, in part, from Bob Dylan's all-too-rarely heard mas-
terpiece, Chimes of Freedom,2 a composition that critic Robert Shelton
has characterized as Dylan's "most political song" and an expression of
"affinity" for a "legion of the abused." 27 In it, Dylan sings:
Through the wild cathedral evening the rain unraveled tales
For the disrobed faceless forms of no position
Tolling for the tongues with no place to bring their thoughts
All down in taken-for-granted situations
Tolling for the deaf an' blind, tolling for the mute
Tolling for the mistreated, mateless mother, the mistitled prosti-
tute
For the misdemeanor outlaw, chased an' cheated by pursuit
An' we gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing.
Dylan is no stranger to ambiguous, nearly oxymoronic imagery.'
24. See, e.g., THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B.
Wexler ed. 1990); ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick
eds. 1991) [hereinafter ESSAYS]; LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1996); THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce J. Winick ed. 1997) [herein-
after TJ APPLIED]; David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David B. Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeuti-
cally, 5 APP'L. & PREVEN. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996); David Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 (1995); 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, §
2D-3, at 534-41; Bibliography of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 915
(1993).
25. I explore the relationships among sanism, pretextuality, and therapeutic jurisprudence in,
inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, "Half- Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth ": Sanism, Pretextuality, and
Why and How Mental Diiability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3
(1999) [hereinafter Perlin, Half-Wracked]; Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Under-
standing the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & Civ.
CONFINEMENT 369 (1994) [hereinafter, Perlin, Understanding]; Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Heal-
Ing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Healing], and in PERLIN, supra
note 23, at 273-303.
26. BOB DYLAN, Chimes of Freedom, on ANOTHER SIDE OF BOB DYLAN (Warner Bros. Inc.
1964).
27. ROBERT SHELTON, No DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 220
(1997).
28. BOB DYLAN, LYRICS, 1962-1985, at 132 (2d ed. 1985).
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The phrase "misdemeanor outlaw" fits here comfortably within his lexi-
con. 30 And it reflects, nearly perfectly I think, the issue that is at the core
of my inquiry here. The subjects are misdemeanants, charged with petty
offenses and minor crimes, but we treat them as outlaws-as recidivistic
criminals. In so doing, we subject them to inappropriately punitive con-
ditions of confinement, which in turn forces us to unnecessarily spend
vast amounts of money on security measures. I hope that this Article
will provide a blueprint for rethinking these mindless and cruel policies.
I. LEGAL CATEGORIES
A. Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial3 1
1. Historical Background
Few principles are as firmly embedded in Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence as the doctrine that an incompetent defendant may not be
put to trial.32 The doctrine is traditionally traced to mid-seventeenth cen-
tury England, 33 with commentators generally focusing on: (1) the in-
29. See BOB SPITZ, DYLAN: A BIOGRAPHY 256 (1989).
30. This phrase, according to the critic Paul Williams, "jump[s] out at the listener exactly like
[a] lightning-illuminated glimpse[] of a familiar yet unreal landscape." PAUL WILLIAMS, BOB
DYLAN: PERFORMING ARTIST 1960-73, THE EARLY YEARS 113 (1990).
31. See generally 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, §§ 14.02 to 14.03, at 206-15. I am including this
section-although there is no parallel section on the history of the insanity defense-because I
believe the historical references I discuss here are generally less well-known and less accessible
than those that track the development of the insanity defense. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1st ed. 1994).
32. See generally Winick, supra note 3.
The incompetency-to-stand-trial determination is a numerically significant one. See, e.g.,
HENRY J. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP? DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 4
(1979) (approximately 9,000 defendants adjudicated incompetent yearly, 36,000 potentially in-
competent defendants evaluated). See also Winick, supra note 3, at 922-23 n.3 (citing other em-
pirical studies).
Professor Winick characterizes the costs of competency evaluations as "staggering." Winick,
supra note 3, at 928. The numerical significance of incompetency determinations contrasts sharply
with the remarkably few insanity defense cases adjudicated yearly. See, e.g., Joseph H. Rodriguez,
et al., The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS
L.J. 397, 401 (1983) (of32,500 criminal cases studied in 1982, insanity defense raised in only 50,
and was successful in only 15); see generally PERLIN, supra note 3 1, at 108-14.
33. Bruce J. Winick & Terry L. DeMeo, Competency to Stand Trial in Florida, 35 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 31, 32 n.2 (1980). See generally GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,
MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 912-15
(1974); HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 428-30 (1954). Roesch
and Golding have suggested that the same problems may have been present as early as the thir-
teenth century. RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 10
(1980).
Professor Slovenko has suggested that, historically, the incompetence plea emerged as a means
by which to "undercut the [death] penalty." Ralph Slovenko, The Developing Law on Competency
to Stand Trial, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 178 (1977). Cf. Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court,
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competent defendant's inability to aid in his defense, 34 (2) the parallels
to the historic ban on trials in absentia,35 and (3) the parallels to the
problems raised by defendants who refuse to plead to the charges en-
tered against them. 6
The primary purpose of the rule was, under all theories, to "safe-
guard the accuracy of adjudication. 3 7 As early as 1899, a federal court
of appeals held that it was not due process of law to subject an "insane
person"--meaning, in this case, an incompetent person-to trial upon an
indictment involving "liberty or life. 3 1 Contemporaneously, a state su-
preme court suggested, "[]t would be inhumane, and to a certain extent
a denial of a trial on the merits, to require one who has been disabled by
the act of God from intelligently making his defense to plead or to be
tried for his life or liberty."39 Thus, it became black letter law that the
trial and conviction of a person mentally and physically4o incapable of
making a defense violates "certain immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of a free government."'4
the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and
the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles Heel, 3 N.Y.L. ScH. HUM. RTS.
ANN. 91, 97 (1985) (questioning the conventional wisdom on the supposed parallel rise of the
insanity defense).
Technically, incompetence is better understood as a status than a plea because it presupposes a
lack of ability to enter a plea. Also, unlike other criminal pleas, it can be raised sua sponte by the
court or the prosecutor. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (a) (1994);
Hamm v. Jabe, 706 F.2d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Warren, 984 F.2d 325, 329
(9th Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, courts frequently continue to characterize incompetence as a "plea."
See, e.g., Waldrip v. State, 482 S.E.2d 299, 304 n.1 (Ga. 1997); Mantano v. State, 649 N.E.2d
1053, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Blanco v. State, No. 05-93-00740-CR, 1994 WL 78892, *3 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 14, 1994).
34. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24 (9th ed. 1783); HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROwN 34 (1847).
35. See, e.g., Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960). This issue is discussed fairly fully in People v. Berling, 251 P.2d
1017 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
36. Until the late eighteenth century, if the court concluded that a defendant was remaining
"mute of malice," it could order him subjected to the practice of peine forte et dure, the placing of
increasingly heavy weights on the defendant's chest to "press" him for an answer. This practice
was abolished in 1772. See Slovenko, supra note 33, at 168. See also Winick, supra note 3, at
952.
37. Claudine Walker Ausness, Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Separat-
ing Those Unfit for Adversary Combat from Those Who Are Fit, 66 KY. L.J. 666, 668 (1978).
38. Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899). Youtsey is discussed at length in
William T. Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional
Problems, 45 U. CIn. L. REv. 21, 21-23 (1977).
39. Jordan v. State, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (Tenn. 1911). See also Ausness, supra note 37, at 670
("A seldom mentioned but powerful psychological reason for the requirement that the defendant
be competent is that in order to satisfy the urge of the community to punish, the defendant must
understand what he is being punished for") (footnotes omitted).
40. On the question of a defendant's physical disability to proceed, see 3 PERLIN, supra note
1, § 14.12, at 242-43; Michael L. Perlin, "Big Ideas, Images and Distorted Facts": The Insanity
Defense, Genetics, and the "Political World," in GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE POTENTIAL
MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 37 (J. Botkin et al. eds., 1999).
41. Sanders v. Allen, 100 F.2d 717,720 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932)).
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American courts quickly adopted the common-law test for assessing
competency to stand trial: 42 "Does the mental impairment of the pris-
oner's mind, if such there be, whatever it is, disable him. . . from fairly
presenting his defense, whatever it may be, and make it unjust to go on
with his trial at this time, or is he feigning to be in that condition ... T,4
To answer this question, courts considered whether the defendant was
"capable of properly appreciating his peril and of rationally assisting in
his own defense."'
This standard-accepted by virtually every jurisdiction on either
statutory or case law bases45 -was slightly modified by the U.S. Su-
preme Court46 in Dusky v. United States,47 where the Court asked
whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and whether
he has a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him." 4 This emphasis on rationality extended earlier doctrine as
to the requisite level of a defendant's understanding; under Dusky, he
must also be able to appraise and assess the proceedings.49
Dusky, which was commonly seen as confusing and "less than help-
ful, ' O was supplemented by Drope v. Missouri5 1 to require that the de-
fendant be able to "assist in preparing his defense. 5 2 The Drope court
held:
42. There is no longer any question that the conviction of a legally incompetent person -vio-
lates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,
378 (1965).
43. United Sates v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 289 (S.D. Ala. 1906). For an earlier characteriza-
tion, see United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1835) (No. 15,577).
44. United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Or. 1941).
45. See Ausness, supra note 37, at 671-72 nn.27-29. For an update, see Barbara Weiner, Men-
tal Disability and the Criminal Law, in SAMUEL JAN. BRAKEL et al., THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 693, 695 (3d ed. 1985).
46. Although Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), established the test only for fed-
eral cases, several circuits and state supreme courts have adopted it as also setting out minimal
constitutional standards. See Ausness, supra note 37, at 673 n.35; Winick & DeMeo, supra note
33, at 35.
47. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
48. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
49. Ausness, supra note 37, at 672. See, e.g., People v. Swallow, 301 N.Y.S.2d 798, 803
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) ("The word 'understanding' requires some depth of understanding, not
merely surface knowledge of the proceedings." (emphasis added)).
For examples of more elaborate tests, see Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through SelectedABA
Standards Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 377-78 (1985)
(discussing N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:4-4 (1981); Wieter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318, 321-22 (W.D.
Mo. 1961); State v. Guatney, 299 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Neb. 1980) (Krivosha, C.J., concurring); FLA.
R. CRIM. PROC. 3.211 (aX1) (1984)).
50. Bennett, supra note 49, at 376. For a survey of literature expressing dissatisfaction with
the imprecision of Dusky formulation, see id. at n.8, and id. at 378-79.
51. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
52. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards combine the Dusky and the Drope tests. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS, Std. 7-4.1(B) (1984) [hereinafter STANDARDS], discussed in Bennett, supra note 49,
at 376.
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[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at
trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial
are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is re-
quired, but... even one of these factors standing alone may, in
some circumstances, be sufficient. There are, of course, no fixed
or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for fur-
ther inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often
a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and sub-
tle nuances are implicated. That they are difficult to evaluate is
suggested by the varying opinions trained psychiatrists can en-
tertain on the same facts.53
To be able to assist counsel, a defendant should have the ability to
communicate, 54 the "capacity to reason from a simple premise to a sim-
ple conclusion, 5 5 the "ability to recall and relate facts concerning his
actions," and the "ability to comprehend instructions and advice, and
make decisions based on well-explained alternatives."57 Several courts
have also considered whether a defendant is particularly susceptible to
deterioration during the course of a trial.58
2. Defendants Awaiting Incompetence Evaluations
As a matter of practice, defendants awaiting evaluations to deter-
mine their competency to stand trial have regularly been sent to maxi-
mum security forensic hospitals, regardless of the underlying criminal
charge, even though such hospitalization is often not necessary or may
even be counter-productive.5 9 Although more forensic cases of all sorts
53. Drape, 420 U.S. 162 at 180. A New York court has listed six factors to be considered in
determinations of incompetency:
[W]hether the defendant: (1) is oriented as to time and place; (2) is able to perceive,
recall, and relate; (3) has an understanding of the process of the trial and the roles
of Judge, jury, prosecutor and defense attorney; (4) can establish a working rela-
tionship with his attorney; (5) has sufficient intelligence and judgment to listen to
the advice of counsel and, based on that advice, appreciate (without necessarily
adopting) the fact that one course of conduct may be more beneficial to him than
another; and (6) is sufficiently stable to enable him to withstand the stresses of the
trial without suffering a serious prolonged or permanent breakdown.
People v. Picozzi, 482 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
54. Peter Silten & Richard Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28
HAsTINas L.J. 1053, 1062 (1977); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454, 457
(1967-68).
55. Silten & Tullis, supra note 54, at 1064.
56. Allen Wilkinson & Arthur Roberts, Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial, 40 AM JUR.
P.O.F.2d 171, at 187 (1984).
57. Id. at 187.
58. E.g., Hamm v. Jabe, 706 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Winick & DeMeo, supra note
33, at 72-73.
59. Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, An Evaluation of Mental Health Expert Assistance Pro-
vided to Indigent Criminal Defendants: Organization, Administration, and Fiscal Management, 34
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are being treated in the community than was common a decade or more
ago, 60 a substantial number of incompetency cases (both evaluations and
post-Jackson commitments) are still treated as a matter of course in
maximum security forensic settings. 6' Such hospitalizations, of course,
often burden the preparation of the defense of a case by making the
gathering of evidence and the discovery of witnesses more difficult.62 In
many-but not all-jurisdictions, bail is ostensibly available to persons
who have raised the issues of incompetence, but such bail is rarely
granted.
63
The length of time for such evaluations often extends far beyond the
possible maximum potential sentence, especially in cases involving rela-
tively minor offenses. 64 Outpatient (or jail-based) evaluations are
cheaper, shorter and less stigmatizing; 65 yet, they are rarely used. This is
especially troubling because a significant percentage of defendants who
are evaluated for competency are charged with minor misdemeanors,6
and a substantial minority of those charged with felonies in at least some
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 19, 67 n.327 (1989); Winick, supra note 3, at 931.
60. Kirk Heilbrun & Patricia Griffin, Forensic Treatment: A Review of Programs and Re-
search, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 241, 255 (Ronald Roesch et al.
eds., 1999).
61. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 812 S.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Ark. 1991); State v. LeFlore, 537
N.W.2d 148 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (table opinion) (unpublished opinion at 1995 WL 366220, *1);
State v. Phillips, 458 N.W.2d 398 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (table opinion) (unpublished opinion at
1990 WL 95989, at *I); Moten v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 704, 705 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
62. Winick, supra note 3, at 948. See Justine Dunlap, What's Competence Got To Do With It?
The Right Not to be Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 495, 520 (1997) ("[A]s
long as the defendant remains incompetent, she would not be able to assist in her defense and
provide her attorney the very information needed to obtain an acquittal").
On the difficulties inherent in the investigation of cases involving individuals institutionalized
in psychiatric hospitals, see generally Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the
Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161
(Summer 1982).
63. Compare e.g., W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-7 (1999 Replacement Volume) ("Notwithstanding
any finding of incompetence to stand trial, . . . the court ... may at any stage of the criminal
proceedings allow a defendant to be released with or without bail"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123 §
17 (1986)); MICH. COMt. LAWS § 330.2036 (1999) ("The right of the defendant to be at liberty
pending trial, on bail or otherwise, shall not be impaired because the issue of incompetence to
stand trial has been raised"); MD. CODE ANN., [Health - General I] § 12-104(b)(2) (1994) (indi-
cating that a court may set bail in non-capital cases where incompetence to stand trial raised), with
WASH. REv. CODE § 10.77.060(1)(b) (1990) (stating that bail may be delayed pending a compe-
tency evaluation; in determining bail, court shall consider whether defendant ever had been previ-
ously found incompetent to stand trial), and State ex rel. Porter v. Wolke, 257 N.W.2d 881, 887
(Wis. 1977) (during period that competence to stand trial is being determined, right to release on
bail is suspended) (construing WIs. STAT. § 971.14 (1998)). But see Winick, supra note 3, at 946
("Another disadvantage facing defendants during the competency process is that raising the com-
petency question routinely defers the setting of bail, ore results in the revocation of bail") (empha-
sis added). Although this policy of automatically withholding bail is followed in many jurisdic-
tions, it is inappropriate and may be unconstitutional.
64. Winick, supra note 3, at 925-26 n.12, quoting STANDARDS, supra note 52, at 7-160.
65. Winick, supra note 3, at 931-32.
66. Bruce Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Pro-
posal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 580 (1995), and
see sources cited in same at 591 nn.102-03.
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jurisdictions are charged with non-violent crimes. 67 No one has chal-
lenged Professor Winick's assertion that, in such cases, "the incompe-
tency-to-stand-trial process has become a back door route to the mental
hospital."6
In some jurisdictions, the rationale for these policies is statutory. In
Indiana, for example, a defendant in "any criminal case" believed to be
incompetent to stand trial shall be confined in "an appropriate psychiat-
ric institution." 69 In other jurisdictions, the policies for psychiatric
evaluation come from court rules or court decisions.7° To be sure, some
jurisdictions provide for the option of outpatient evaluations, 71 and in
some cases, both outpatient and inpatient examinations are ordered"72
Kansas, for example, differentiates between the two in this manner:
To facilitate the examination, the court may: (a) If the defendant
is charged with a felony, commit the defendant to the state secu-
rity hospital or any county or private institution for examination
and report to the court, or, if the defendant is charged with a
misdemeanor, commit the defendant to any appropriate state,
county or private institution for examination and report to the
court, except that the court shall not commit the defendant to the
state security hospital or any other state institution unless, prior
to such commitment, the director of a local county or private in-
stitution recommends to the court and to the secretary of social
and rehabilitation services that examination of the defendant
should be performed at a state institution; ...73
3. Following an Incompetency Finding
When defendants are incompetent to stand trial, the overwhelming
67. See Elisa Robbins et al., Competency to Stand Trial Evaluations: A Study ofActual Prac-
tice In Two States, 25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 469, 475 (1997) (Table 2) (demonstrating
that of 16 cases studied in Nebraska, nine involved violent crimes, and five involved non-violent
crimes).
68. Winick, supra note 66, at 591 n.102.
69. IND. CODE § 35-36-3-1 (Supp. 1981).
70. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. PRO. 11.2(d), discussed in this context in Dixon v. State, 668 So.
2d 65, 66 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Apparently, however, some Alabama evaluations are done on
an outpatient basis. See, e.g., Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1353, 1354 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994);
Jackson v. State, 560 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
71. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1 (Michie 1995); State v. Dearry, No. 03CC01-9612-
CC-00462, 1998 WL 47946, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 1998); see also TENN. CODE ANN, §
33-7-301(aXl) (1998); United States v. Deters, 143 F.3d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1998) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 4247(b) (1994)); State v. Evans, 424 S.E.2d 512, 513 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); see generally
Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court in Massachu-
setts: Issues of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENO. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 321,
321-24 (1994), discussing MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 123, §§ 15-17 (1986).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 36 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
73. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3302 (3) (1995).
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majority are committed to state hospitals. 4 Typical is the Alabama prac-
tice: "If it finds that [the defendant is incompetent to stand trial], the
court shall make an order committing him to the Alabama state hospi-
tals, where he must remain until he is restored to his right mind."75
These commitments are frequently followed by a "shuttle process" by
which defendants are stabilized, returned to jail to await trial, and re-
turned to the hospital following relapse.7 6 Professor Winick quotes a
forensic report commissioned by a Dade County (Florida) mental health
board: "The well known chain of events from incompetency determina-
tion to hospital to stabilization to return to jail to decompensation to re-
determination of incompetency to re-hospitalization several times,
means that some individuals are well known subjects of repeated foren-
sic evaluations. " 77
The Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana,78 banning
indeterminate commitments in incompetency evaluation cases if there is
no reasonable probability that the defendant will regain his competence
within the "foreseeable future,"79 has had surprisingly-"shockingly"
might be a better descriptor-little impact on these practices.80 Astonish-
ingly, more than half the states allow for the indefinite commitment of
incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants, in spite of Jackson's specific lan-
guage outlawing this practice.8 ' In their comprehensive 1993 survey,
Professors Grant Morris and J. Reid Meloy found that the key question
of Jackson-what is a "reasonable period of time" necessary to deter-
mine whether a defendant will so attain his capacity to stand trial?-was
not answered by the statutes of over thirty states. 2
74. Winick, supra note 3, at 925.
75. ALA. CODE § 15-16-21 (1975).
76. Winick, supra note 3, at 934-38. See especially id. at 935-36 n.57 (detailing the multiple
transfers and tortured odyssey in the case of State v. Alexander, No. 74-4975 (Dade County (FL)
Cir. Ct.)); Bruce Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and
a Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 248-49 (1987); see also State v. Carter, 316
A.2d 449, 464 n.1 (N.J. 1974) (Clifford, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (recounting
the "procedural jungle through which defendant has sought to make his way").
77. Winick, supra note 3, at 934 n.52, quoting E. NUEHRING, L. RAYBIN, A. PASCONE, E.
FRITSCHE & S. GRAY, A PLANNING AND NEEDS STUDY IN THE AREA OF COMMUNITY
PROGRAMMING FOR FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH CLIENTS 39 (1984).
78. 406 U.S. 715.
79. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 733.
80. See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47
U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 680 (1993).
81. Winick, supra note 3, at 927 n.17; see also Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of
Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants,
27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (noting that more than half the states never implemented
Jackson). I discuss the implications of these findings in Perlin, Half-Wracked supra note 25, at
23-24.
82. Morris & Meloy, supra note 81, at 26:
Although more than twenty years have passed since the Court decided Jackson,
this question has not been answered by the statutes of thirty states and the District
of Columbia. Of this number, twenty-three jurisdictions do not address the issue at
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Some states make special provisions for incompetency findings in
misdemeanor cases;83 others do not. For example, Louisiana merely
mandates that persons "found incompetent to stand trial" shall be com-
mitted to the Feliciana [maximum security] Forensic Facility or other
such facility established by the state legislature.84 In Kansas, this
differentiation is made:
A defendant who is charged with a felony and is found to be in-
competent to stand trial shall be committed for evaluation and
treatment to the state security hospital or any appropriate county
or private institution. A defendant who is charged with a misde-
meanor and is found to be incompetent to stand trial shall be
committed for evaluation and treatment to any appropriate state,
county or private institution. 1
However, few states make special provisions for committed incompetent
all. Eight states address the issue but do not specify the length of the evaluation de-
tention period. Typically, these statutes merely parrot the Jackson language allow-
ing the incompetent defendant's detention for a "reasonable" period. Of the twenty
states that specify the length of the detention period, ninety days is the most fre-
quent period specified, with the shortest period being thirty days and the longest be-
ing twelve months...
Is the court that ordered the incompetent defendant's treatment statutorily obli-
gated to review periodically the defendant's progress toward attaining competence?
Although more than twenty years have passed since the Court decided Jackson, the
question has not been answered by the statutes of thirty-two states and the District
of Columbia. Of this number, twenty jurisdictions do not address the issue at all.
Thirteen states mandate a clinical review of the defendant's condition but do not re-
quire a court hearing. In four of the thirteen states, the frequency of clinical review
is not specified. In the ten states that do specify frequency of clinical review, a
ninety-day interval is most typically mandated.
Of the eighteen states whose statutes mandate judicial oversight, eight states re-
quire a hearing at the end of ninety days and subsequent hearings after an additional
ninety days or some lengthier period of time. The statutes of six states mandate an
initial court review after six months. Maine requires a court review after thirty days,
the shortest period specified. California requires a court review after eighteen
months, the longest period specified.
See Id. at 9-12.
83. In Texas, the legislature differentiates between commitments of persons incompetent be-
cause of mental illness and mental retardation. "When a defendant has been determined incompe-
tent to stand trial for any felony or for a misdemeanor because of mental retardation," and is
covered by the relevant language of Jackson, "the court shall enter an order committing the defen-
dant to the maximum security unit of any facility designated by the Texas Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation, to an agency of the United States operating a mental hospital, or
to a Veterans Administration hospital for a period not to exceed 18 months." TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
ANN. art. 46.02, § 5(a) (West Supp. 2000). On the other hand, "[w]hen a defendant has been de-
termined incompetent to stand trial for a misdemeanor because of mental illness," and is covered
by the Jackson language, "the court shall enter an order committing the defendant to the mental
health facility designated by the Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation to serve
the catchment area in which the committing court is located for a period not to exceed 18
months." Id.
84. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:25.1(C)(I)(aXiv) (West Supp. 2000).
85. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3303(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
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misdemeanants.' 6
In some other jurisdictions, post-Jackson commitments are made
either to maximum security facilities or to other facilities (outpatient or
inpatient) depending on the court's findings.81 Some states do premise
the choice between inpatient and outpatient evaluations on the extent of
the defendant's dangerousness, 88 but few statutes specify the degree of
dangerousness as a discriminating criteria at this stage.8 9
"Empirical studies demonstrate that trial judges misunderstand the
relationship between a finding of incompetency to stand trial and subse-
quent hospital commitment."' 9 In a state-wide study conducted four
years after the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson, almost one-half of
all judges polled believed that commitment of incompetent criminal de-
fendants to forensic hospitals should be automatic without regard to the
severity of the underlying criminal offense or the defendant's present
dangerousness. 91 A subsequent national study of trial judges revealed
that such hospitalization was the judicial intervention of choice in nearly
ninety percent of all cases.9 Even in states that expressly sanction out-
patient commitment as an alternative in criminal incompetency cases,
judges remain reluctant to employ this mechanism due to their fear that
the patient might become violent in an outpatient setting. 93
Also disturbing is the often unstated but lingering assumption that
any defendant on whose "behalf' the incompetency status is raised is, in
fact, "factually guilty" of the underlying crime. When I was a public
defender, I represented in individual cases well over 200 criminal de-
fendants who had been found-at some point-incompetent to stand
86. But see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367.1 (West 2000) (providing special provisions for
misdemeanor cases); KAN. STAT. ANN § 22-3302(3)(a) (1995) (providing the same).
87. E.g., MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. § 101-B(4) (West 1990); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1367.1,
1370, 1370.1 (West 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 504.060 (Banks-Baldwin 1999) (defining "[t]reatment facility" and "[florensic
psychiatric facility"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.2026 (West 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.371 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-6A-1 to 2 (1999).
88. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6b (West Supp. 2000) (requiring a defendant to be commit-
ted to state department of human services if he is "so dangerous to himself or others as to require
institutionalization").
89. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6b (West Supp. 2000); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370
(West Supp. 2000).
90. Perlin, supra note 80, at 680; see also Dunlap, supra note 62, at 520 (discussing the ex-
tent of "professional confusion" in this area).
91. Ronald Roesch & Stephen Golding, Legal and Judicial Interpretation of Competency to
Stand Trial Statutes and Procedures, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 420, 423-24 (1978).
Professor Mark Weber has (appropriately) questioned whether judges may-perhaps uncon-
sciously-do this to create a disincentive for criminal defendants to feign incompetency. Personal
communication with Mark Weber (Mar. 3, 2000). 1 partially address this issue in Perlin, supra
note 80, at 678-79; see also infra text accompanying note 294.
92. Ingo Keilitz & J. Rudy Martin, Criminal Defendants With Trial Disabilities: The Theory
and Practice of Competency Assistance (1984) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
93. Ann L. Hester, State v. Gravette: Is There Justice for Incompetent Defendants in North
Carolina?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1484, 1497 (1991).
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trial.94 In not a single case did the prosecutor, the judge, or the forensic
evaluator even acknowledge the possibility that the defendant might
have been "factually innocent" of the underlying charge. 95 This is a topic
that has been rarely, if ever, addressed in the case law or the legal or
behavioral literature, 96 but I am convinced that it is one that must be
taken seriously if we are going to carefully and comprehensively exam-
ine this question.
4. Conclusion
In short, the vast majority of incompetency evaluations are held in
maximum security facilities without regard to the severity of the crime
or the dangerousness of the defendant.97 Post-evaluation commitments
are similarly inevitably ordered to such facilities without similar regard
to the nature of the crime, the defendant's dangerousness, or the letter
and spirit of the Supreme Court's Jackson v. Indiana decision of twenty-
eight years ago.
94. See Dixon v. Cahill, No. L.30977-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div. 1973) (implement-
ing Jackson), reprinted in 3 PERLI, supra note 1, § 14.17, at 256-59. I was class counsel to plain-
tiffs in Dixon, and, after the entry of the consent decree, the trial judge appointed me to individu-
ally represent each member of the class. Approximately 215 of the class members had previously
been found incompetent to stand trial.
95. Of course, in an insanity defense case, the entry of an NGRI plea is an admission that the
defendant, in fact, committed the acts that would be criminal but for the defendant's asserted lack
of responsibility. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983); see also infra notes 118-124;
Dunlap, supra note 62, at 522 (discussing the special problems raised when a possibly incompe-
tent defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity).
96. Compare Mark Sblendorio, Note, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 735, 739 n.13 (1997) (noting
that "[o]ne of the most significant distinctions between an incompetency finding and a verdict of
NGRI is that the defendant in an NGRI is assumed to have committed the criminal action at issue,
but the incompetent defendant is never even 'put to trial' on the criminal charge"), to John Kip
Cornwall, Confining Mentally Disordered "Super-Criminals": A Realignment of Rights in the
Nineties, 33 Hous. L. REV. 651, 653 (1996) (noting that because "mentally disordered offenders
have engaged, or are suspected of having engaged, in criminal activity, they may pose a greater
threat to society than individuals civilly committed to the custody of the state or federal govern-
ment and should perhaps be subject to different standards for involuntary detention on this basis."
(emphasis added)).
97. Again, in many major cities-New York, Baltimore, San Diego, Boston, and others-the
presence of forensic court clinics have substantially ameliorated this problem. See generally,
Casey & Keilitz, supra note 59, at 66-87; see also, e.g., David Finkelman & Thomas Grisso,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Idea to Application, 20 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ.
CONFINEMENT 243, 254-55 (1994); Ronnie Harmon et al., Sex and Violence in a Forensic Popula-
tion of Obsessional Harassers, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 236 (1998); Ansar Haroun & Grant
Morris, Weaving a Tangled Web: The Deceptions of Psychiatrists, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
1227 (1999). A review of national practice, however, reveals that, globally, these are still the
exception.
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B. Defendants Pleading Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity9 8
1. Introduction
Insanity pleaders are among the most despised individuals in our
society, 99 and our revulsion appears to increase with every report of an
attempted insanity defense in a high-profile case, whether or not that
defense is "successful," whether or not it leads to a lengthy commitment
in a maximum security facility, and whether or not there is any question
as to the profundity of the defendant's mental illness or his lack of
criminal responsibility. °° In a series of books and articles,' 0 ' I have at-
tempted to come to grips with both the incoherence of our insanity de-
fense jurisprudence and the roots of our virulent antipathy.'02 Whatever
the cause (or causes) of these feelings,'0 3 I have no doubt that they are
98. See generally 3 PERLIN, supra note I, §§ 15.01-15.43, at 277-409. The important substan-
tive insanity defense tests are discussed in 3 id., §§ 15.03-15.09, at 286-313.
99. Successful insanity defendants have traditionally been perceived as perhaps the "most
despised" and most "morally repugnant" group of individuals in society. See Deborah C. Scott et.
al., Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut's Psychiatric Security Review Board, 41 HoSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 980, 982 (1990). See also Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which
Separated You From Me": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and
the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1379 (1997); see also Perlin, supra note 15, at
1247 n.5.
100. Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense"
and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 8-12 (1990) (describing how high-profile insanity
cases result in calls for the abolition of the defense).
101. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 31; Perlin, supra note 40; Perlin, supra note 99; Perlin, su-
pra note 100; Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of
Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin,
Myths]; Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense: Deconstructing the Myths and Reconstructing
the Jurisprudence, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL DISORDER 341 (Bruce Sales & Daniel
Shuman eds. 1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Deconstructing]; Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths:
The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599
(1989-90) [hereinafter Perlin, Unpacking].
102. See Perlin, supra note 99, at 1378 ("The overarching question to explore is: Why do we
feel the way we do about these people (insanity pleaders), and how does the answer to that ques-
tion preordain our answers to almost all of the legal and behavioral questions that are posed in this
area?").
103. I concluded a recent insanity defense piece this way:
It is important to us-as individuals and as members of a larger community-to
know that there is a "borderline" separating "you from me." Or, at the least, to be-
lieve that there is. On one hand, the insanity defense appears to establish such a
borderline between those of us who are found to be criminally responsible for our
acts and those of us who are not. But, on the other hand, a significant portion of so-
ciety believes that the insanity defense actually blurs the borderline between good
and evil, between "good guys" and "bad guys." . .. [W]e feel "doublecrossed," be-
cause it appears that "these people" are "getting away with it." And we feel that
way even though we know-rationally and objectively-that, in that minute statisti-
cally insignificant universe of cases in which defendants do succeed in contested in-
sanity defense cases, these defendants are subsequently incarcerated in maximum
security institutions for periods of time as long as or, in many cases, much longer
than they would have spent in prison for the same offense.
We know this and we ignore it, because we do not care about this objective real-
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the (unconscious, perhaps) reason for the policies that control both the
insanity defense evaluation process and the system of retention and in-
stitutionalization of insanity acquittees.
2. Insanity Evaluations
Insanity evaluations have traditionally been held on an inpatient
basis at state forensic facilities.1 4 Statutes often specify that such a fa-
cility be "secure"105 or "suitably secure,"'06 and the emphasis is fre-
quently on the question of custody. In Colorado, for instance, the court
"shall give priority to the place where the defendant is in custody' ' 1° in
determining where the insanity evaluation should be done: Typically, the
laws governing such evaluations make no discrimination between the
types of predicate offenses with which the defendant might be charged
or the level of his dangerousness. 108 For example, in Arkansas,
"[w]henever a defendant charged in circuit court" files notice that he
intends to rely upon an insanity defense, the court "shall" enter an order
ity, a reality about which-following the publication of Henry Steadman's ground-
breaking research-there can no longer be the shadow of a doubt. We do not care
about it because this is simply an area too emotionally freighted for us to handle.
Neither our legal system nor our individual psyches have the tensile strength re-
quired to accept the tensions and ambiguities inherent on a maturely functioning in-
sanity defense system-one in which that "borderline" is inevitably so deeply
blurred. Simply put, we cannot deal with the fact that insanity-pleading defendants
may be more like us than not like us, and we thus develop elaborate mechanisms
(legal and psychological) to distance ourselves from them and from that unaccept-
able reality.
So we accept an insanity defense system that is sanist, pretextual and teleological,
a system that rests on the shaky underpinnings of heuristic reasoning and a false
OCS [ordinary common sense]. And this acceptance may ultimately doom to failure
any attempt to reconstitute insanity defense policy, even when examined through
the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Why is this? I believe that our refusal to care about or think about the objective
realities that I have been discussing, and our dogged, banal reliance on sanist myths
and pretextual reasoning is made far easier by both phenomena that I discussed ear-
lier: by our authoritarian spirit, and our culture of punishment. These phenomena al-
low us-encourage us-to wilfully [sic] blind ourselves to behavioral, scientific,
cultural and empirical realities [sic], They do this to preserve the illusion of a "bor-
derline" between "you and me". The evanescence of this borderline becomes, in the
end, the reason why, after centuries, our insanity defense jurisprudence continues to
operate as it always has-out of consciousness.
Perlin, supra note 99, at 1425-26.
104. See, e.g., Casey & Keilitz, supra note 59, at 67 n.327 (discussing the practice in one
state).
105. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.070(a) (Michie 1998).
106. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.060(1)(a) (West Supp. 2000).
107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-106(l) (West 1998).
108. But see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 135:17-a (Supp. 1999) (listing array of facilities to
which defendant may be sent for evaluation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (West 1989)
(distinguishing evaluation sites in cases in which defendants are charged with crimes "involving
the death or serious physical injury of or the threat of death or serious physical injury" to an-
other); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 15 (1986) (specifying commitment to Bridgewater State
Hospital if"such person is a male and appears to require strict security").
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"[c]ommitting the defendant to the Arkansas State Hospital or other ap-
propriate facility for the purpose of the examination.
''1°9
3. Following Insanity Acquittals
Following a finding of NGRI, "successful" insanity acquittees are
invariably committed to maximum security forensic facilities for lengthy
periods of time." The commitments are sometimes termed "auto-
matic," ' and such commitments are often made mandatory by state
law." 2 These time periods are often far longer than the defendants would
have received had they been given the maximum sentence for the under-
lying criminal charge, 13 and the disparity between the maximum sen-
tence and the time spent in a maximum security facility as an insanity
acquittee is largest in the cases of misdemeanors and other minor
crimes." 4 One California study revealed that the average stay of the
"successful" insanity misdemeanor acquittee is nine times as long as the
average sentence of criminal defendants convicted of like charges.' '
5
As early as 1976, state policies that mandated the institutionalization
of insanity acquittees in maximum security facilities were criticized by
commentators who argued that the then-nascent LRA doctrine should
equally apply in such cases and that due process mandated that place-
ments of insanity acquittees must be made to "the least drastic setting
commensurate with [the defendant's] condition subsequent to his com-
109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305 (a), (b)(1)(D) (Michie 1997). Interestingly, when a defendant
pleads insanity in a family law contempt proceeding, the only place to which he can be committed
for an evaluation is the Arkansas State Hospital. See id. § 9-14-104(a).
110. See also, e.g., Abraham Halpern, The Insanity Verdict The Psychopath, and the Post-
Acquittal Confinement, 24 PAC. L.J. 1125, 1132-33 (1993).
111. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (1978) (discussing automatic civil commitment of
defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity).
112. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(a) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I I, § 403 (1998);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.030 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); ALA. CODE § 22-52-33 (1997); FLA.
STAT. ANN. ch. § 916.15 (HARRISON 1999); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 654 (West 2000);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 1994). Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321
(1999) (mandating that commitment is "automatic," and that if the underlying crime involved
infliction or attempted infliction of "serious physical injury or death," commitment is to forensic
unit; in the case of all other crimes, commitment is to a "State 24-hour facility").
113. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363-68 (1983).
114. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-3(a) (1999) ("The court shall commit such defendant to a
mental health facility under the jurisdiction of the department of health, with the court retaining
jurisdiction over the defendant for the maximum sentence period").
115. HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY
DEFENSE REFORM 58-61 (1993); see also Perlin, supra note 99, at 1405 n.194.
Of course, it is possible that, even if the Supreme Court had decided Jones differently (limiting
insanity acquittal commitments to the maximum time to which the defendant could have been
sentenced had he been convicted of the underlying criminal charges), some of these defendants
would have been subjected to involuntary civil commitment at the conclusion of their insanity
acquittal commitment. In this situation, however, the individuals in question would have likely
been subjected to less restrictive conditions of confinement and to different allocations of the
burden of proof on applications for release. See, e.g.. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 727-30
(1972).
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mitment hearing."1 16 There was little judicial response to these criti-
cisms.11
7
It is clear that the United States Supreme Court is comfortable with
lengthy post-acquittal commitments, even in cases involving nonviolent
offenses. In Jones v. United States,118 a case involving an attempted
petty larceny (shoplifting), the Court rejected the defendant's arguments
that it was unconstitutional to confine a defendant as an insanity acquit-
tee for a longer period of time than that to which he could have been
sentenced had he been given the maximum sentence for the underlying
crime." 9 First, the Court saw no reason to treat a misdemeanor case any
different from a case involving a murder, rape, or armed robbery. It
quoted from an earlier decision of the District of Columbia Circuit that
had been written by Chief Justice Burger when he was on that court:
"[T describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than mur-
der or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is
the same as to both."' 20 Beyond this, the Court saw no reason to limit the
term of an insanity acquittee's confinement to the statutory maximum
for the underlying crime. 12' After pointing out that the entry of an insan-
ity plea is an admission that the defendant committed the acts that are
the elements of the underlying crime, 122 the Court stressed that "[tihere
simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and
length of time necessary for recovery. The length of the acquittee's hy-
pothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment. '123
Jones was a political decision that permitted indeterminate commit-
ment and reflected the Supreme Court's "unwillingness to contradict
116. June German & Anne Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Ac-
quitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1052 (1976), see generally id. at 1050-
53.
117. But see, e.g., State v. Stacy, 601 S.W.2d 696, 705 (Tenn. 1980) (Henry, J., dissenting)
(reiterating that "[a]utomatic commitment and prolonged confinement of those found not guilty of
criminal charges by reason of insanity are prohibited") (citing German & Singer, supra note 116,
at 1025); In re Anderson, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that "[clommunity
treatment of a mental patient facilitates the patient's adjustment to community life and in many
cases speeds restoration of his sanity as well as affording state institutional personnel the opportu-
nity to make an informed decision as to the patient's suitability for absolute discharge") (citing
German & Singer, supra note 116, at 1068).
118. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
119. Jones, 463 U.S. at 363-68.
120. Id. at 365 n.14 (quoting Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir.1961)).
121. Id. at 368.
122. We turn first to the question whether the finding of insanity at the criminal trial is
sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant
committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act be-
cause of mental illness.
Id. at 363.
123. Id. at 369.
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public sentiment [soon after the Hinckley acquittal] in such a controver-
sial area.' 124 It further provided the Court with a vehicle to impose its
dissatisfaction with the insanity defense on defendants who succeeded in
the use of a plea by making it even less likely that the plea would be
used in the future. 125
Decisions in other NGRI cases are often just as overtly political. The
public's faith in the judicial process becomes threatened when an insan-
ity defense acquittal appears to reflect "official permissiveness."' 26 Such
a loss of faith has profound implications for the system's "gatekeepers"
who must enforce the system's values and becomes explicitly more
problematic in controversial cases, the most glaring example of which is
that of John W. Hinckley.1
27
[T]he final report of the National Institute of Mental Health's Ad
Hoc Forensic Advisory Panel, which was specifically selected to
review the policies and procedures of the St. Elizabeth's Hospi-
tal Forensic Division (where Hinckley is housed), underscored
the pragmatic issues afoot in such a case. "From the perspective
of the Hospital," noted the Report, "in controversial cases such
as Hinckley, the U.S. Attorney's Office can be counted upon to
oppose any conditional release recommendation." The bureau-
cratic issue is not one of moral philosophy, of treatment philoso-
phy, or of clinical conditions: it is the political reality that the
government will be sure to oppose release of a "controversial"
patient. '28
There is no question that inpatient treatment is often seen as the only
"politically acceptable" setting in which insanity acquittees can be
housed.'2 9 Further, while insanity acquittees are eligible for transfer to
less restrictive settings in some states, 30 in others, courts are even with-
124. See 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 3.43, at
333 (1st ed. 1989) (quoting Louise Dovre, Jones v. United States: Automatic Commitment of
Individuals Found Not Guilty byReason of Insanity, 68 MINN. L. REV. 822, 840 (1984)).
125. PERLIN, supra note 31, at 200-0 1; 1 PERLIN supra note 124, § 3.43, at 333 n.702 (citing,
inter alia, Janet Polstein, Throwing Away the Key: Due Process Rights of Insanity Acquittees in
Jones v. United States, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 521 (1985)).
126. Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 101, at 670 n.320, (quoting Scott Sherman, Guilty But
Mentally Ill: A Retreat From the Insanity Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 237, 252 n.113 (1981));
Henry Steadman et al., The Use of the Insanity Defense, in THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK,
A REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CAREY 37, 38-39 (1978).
127. See PERLIN, supra note 31, at 333-48.
128. Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 101, at 670.
129. Sherin Vitro, Promoting Therapeutic Objectives Through LB 518: A Sane Amendment to
Nebraska Law Governing the Disposition of Insanity Acquittees, 72 NEB. L. REV. 837, 854 n. 129
(1993).
130. See State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 297-98 (N.J. 1975); see generally 1 PERLIN, supra note
1, § 2A-4.4b, at 133-39.
See also Marilyn Hammond, Predictions of Dangerousness in Texas: Psychotherapists' Con-
flicting Duties, Their Potential Liability, and Possible Solutions, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 141, 150
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out jurisdiction to hear challenges to placements in maximum secu-
rity.131 Although a student note writer has appropriately recognized that
judges "cannot allow political pressures and public reactions to insanity
acquittals to cause them to view inpatient treatment as the only appro-
priate treatment,"' 32 the reality is that judges do exactly this, whether the
charge is serious or minor. In short, placement of insanity acquittees is
driven by a political decision-making process which largely ignores both
the quality of the crime and the dangerousness of the individual defen-
dant.133
C. Conclusion
The evidence is clear. The vast majority of incompetency-to-stand-
trial and insanity evaluations are conducted in maximum security facili-
ties, and a like majority of incompetency-to-stand-trial and insanity
commitments are ordered to such facilities, regardless of the severity of
the offense or, in many cases, the dangerousness of the individual de-
fendant.'3 These practices have continued notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana and notwithstanding unanimous
scholarly criticism of both the states' failures to coherently implement
Jackson135 and of the overtly political agenda of Jones v. United
States. 1
36
Strangely absent from much of the discourse has been a considera-
tion of the application of the LRA doctrine to the questions at hand. Fif-
teen years ago, Professor Bruce Winick perceptively noted the relation-
(1980) (discussing the practice in Texas):
Predictions of dangerousness are required in the commitment procedures of criminal
defendants who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. If such a defen-
dant is determined to be "manifestly dangerous" by a team of three psychiatrists, he
will be detained in the state facility for the criminally insane or in a maximum secu-
rity unit of another state hospital. If the team decides the defendant is not mani-
festly dangerous, he is sent to a nonsecurity unit. Here, if the head of the facility
decides it best for the protection of others, the defendant can be indefinitely com-
mitted. Determinations of dangerousness by mental health personnel are instrumen-
tal in decisions about commitment of criminal defendants.
(Footnotes omitted).
131. E.g., Champagne v. Lewis, No. CV-960565267, 1998 WL 321831, *2 (Conn. Super. June
9, 1998).
132. Vitro, supra note 129, at 854.
133. There is, to be sure, great irony in the fact that the most expansive due process decision in
this area-Krol-involves a defendant charged with murder, while the most restrictive decision-
Jones-involves a defendant charged with shoplifting.
134. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); see also, e.g., Havis
v. City of Guntersville, 586 So. 2d 947 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).
135. See, e.g., Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 25, at 23-24 (discussing the research reported
in Winick, supra note 3; Morris & Meloy, supra note 81; and Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assump-
tion: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 39, 48 (1992)).
136. See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 124, § 3.43, at 332-35 nn.701-08 (citing sources).
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ship between this principle and the incompetency-to-stand-trial proc-
ess. 137 Nearly twenty-five years ago, June German and Anne Singer
similarly noted this relationship in the context of the insanity acquittee
retention process. 138 Little attention, however, has been paid to these
insights in the intervening years. In the next section, I will turn to the
development of the LRA principle in mental disability law, before mov-
ing on to the Americans with Disabilities Act.
II. THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
139
A. Lessard v. Schmidt
The "least restrictive alternative" ("LRA") doctrine was first given
constitutional life in the mental health context by the involuntary civil
commitment case of Lessard v. Schmidt. 4' There, after crafting a sub-
stantive commitment standard 14 ' and mandating a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard of proof,'42 the federal district court ruled that: "[e]ven if
the standards for an adjudication of mental illness and potential danger-
ousness are satisfied, a court should order full-time involuntary hospi-
talization only as a last resort."' 43
The court concluded that "persons suffering from the condition of
being mentally ill, but who are not alleged to have committed any crime,
cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less drastic means
for achieving the same basic goal."' 44 It placed the burden for exploring
alternatives to institutionalization on "the person recommending full-
time involuntary hospitalization," who must prove:
(1) what alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were
investigated; and (3) why the investigated alternatives were not
deemed suitable. These alternatives include voluntary or court-
ordered outpatient treatment, day treatment in a hospital, night
137. See Winick, supra note 3, at 943 n.97: "Under the least restrictive alternative doctrine,..
where outpatient treatment is at least as effective as hospitalization in restoring a particular
defendant's competency to stand trial, hospitalization, involving a greater deprivation of the de-
fendant's constitutional rights, would seem constitutionally offensive." (citation omitted).
138. See German & Singer, supra note 116, at 1050-53.
139. See generally I PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2C-5.3a, at 419-23; Perlin, supra note 14.
140. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand,
379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318
(E.D. Wis. 1976), superceded by statute as stated in Flower v. Leean, No. 99-2999, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 9617 (7th Cir. May 3, 2000).
141. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, §2A-4.4a, at 126-32.
142. See id., § 2C-5.1, at 392-94; see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (holding that
clear convincing evidence is all that is constitutionally required).
143. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1095.
144. Id. at 1096 (emphasis added).
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treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of a friend or
relative, placement in a nursing home, referral to a community
mental health clinic, and home health aide services. 45
Lessard's reasoning was subsequently adopted in other civil commit-
ment challenges146 and endorsed extensively in the literature. 47 Other
courts quickly expanded the scope of the LRA doctrine beyond involun-
tary civil commitment decision-making14' to include regulation of the
conditions of confinement, 149 the availability of treatment, 5 ° and the
right of a patient to refuse treatment. 151 Notwithstanding the Lessard
court's disclaimer about patients not charged with crime, 152 a handful of
cases also considered the applicability of the doctrine to cases involving
145. Id.
For a list of factors to be weighed in determining the LRA, see Ingo Keilitz t al., Least Restric-
five Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating Concepts Into Practice, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J.
691, 696 (1985) (stating that factors include:
the environmental restrictiveness of the treatment setting; the psychological or
physical restrictiveness of behavioral, chemical, or biological treatment; clinical
variables, including the person's behavior as it relates to the legal criteria for invol-
untary commitment; the relative risks and benefits of treatment alternatives; the
family and community support available in the person's environment; the quality or
likely effectiveness of the alternative care and treatment; the duration of treatment;
the likelihood that a person may pose a risk to public safety; the availability, cost,
and accessibility of alternative treatment and care; the likelihood of the person's
cooperation or compliance with the conditions of alternative treatment programs;
and mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing that compliance)
(footnote omitted).
146. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132-33 (D. Haw. 1976); Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974), superseded by statute as stated in Garrett v.
State, 707 So. 2d 273 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) ; Application of D.D., 285 A.2d 283, 286 (N.J. Super.
CL App. Div. 1971); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889, 892 (N.Y. 1973).
147. For a collection of relevant scholarship, see David Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least
Restrictive Alternative Analysis and the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA.
L REV. 375, 402-03 n.109 (1981).
148. See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 703 P.2d 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the issue of the
patient's right to a written treatment plan, and holding that an order for treatment which commit-
ted a patient to program of combined inpatient and outpatient treatment was void, absent a show-
ing that the court was presented with and approved a written treatment plan); see also In re
J.M.R., 505 A.2d 662 (Vt. 1986) (holding that the trial court could not continue involuntary
treatment on nonhospitalized basis for indeterminate time, absent some finding that the patient
was dangerous to himself or others, or would become so if treatment plan was discontinued); but
see In re Harhut, 367 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the trial court erred in pre-
scribing specific treatment programs, in ordering the county to prepare treatment reports and the
hospital to submit a program plan to the court, and in ordering the county to create community
placements in a commitment order).
149. See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982), on
remand, 691 F.2d 634 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Matter of James, 547 N.E.2d 759, 761-62 (Ill. App.
CL 1989) (holding that an absence of report on appropriateness and availability of alternative
treatment facilities and preliminary treatment plan required commitment reversal).
[50. See, e.g., Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 457 U.S. 307
(1982), on remand 687 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1982).
151. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), supplemented., 476 F. Supp.
1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on
remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
152. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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prisoners transferred to mental hospitals 153 and insanity acquittees seek-
ing release. 1 4 By the late 1970s, the LRA concept had apparently been
successfully-and virtually completely-engrafted on to the involuntary
civil commitment process.' 55
B. The Significance ofYoungberg
The vitality of the LRA as a constitutional doctrine was called into
question by the United States Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Young-
berg v. Romeo.156 In that case, the Third Circuit had initially held that
involuntarily institutionalized persons with mental retardation had a
right to habilitation in the least restrictive alternative.157 Under its com-
plex formulation of this doctrine, the court directed the use of the "least
intrusive" means analysis where an institutional defendant sought to
justify "severe intrusions on individual dignity."' 151
This argument was ultimately abandoned at the U.S. Supreme Court
level by plaintiffs counsel, who "concede[d] that this issue is not pres-
ent in this case.' '159 The Court then articulated, for the first time, those
substantive constitutional rights owed to mentally retarded persons who
had been involuntarily committed to state institutions.' 6° In restating the
scope of these rights, the Court added that plaintiff was entitled to "rea-
sonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions.' 16' This phrase was nei-
ther defined nor explained, yet it appears to be the Court's first ac-
knowledgment that some calibration of restrictivity of treatment is es-
sential in any case construing substantive treatment rights.162
Citing in a cf reference Jackson v. Indiana163 and in an earlier foot-
note that had distinguished Jackson,'64 the Court did explain that "[s]uch
153. See Dobbs v. Neverson, 393 A.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Johnson v. Levine, 450
F. Supp. 648, 657-58 (D. Md. 1987) affd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 588
F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978), on appeal after remand sub nom. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th
Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Souder v. Watson, 413 F. Supp. 711 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
154. See Matter of Portus, 371 N.W.2d 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Matter of Commitment of
J.L.J., 481 A.2d 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
155. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2C-5.3b, at 424 ("By 1985, thirty-nine states required
courts to consider alternatives to hospitalization at the time of involuntary civil commitment. Of
the few jurisdictions without such a direct statutory requirement, several grant the hearing court
discretionary power to make such an inquiry; and others do so by administrative regulation.")
(footnotes omitted).
156. 457 U.S. 307 (1982), on remand, 987 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1982).
157. Romeo v. Youngberg. 644 F.2d 147, 166 (1980).
158. Romeo, 644 F.2d at 166.
159. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 313 n. 14.
160. Id. at 314.
161. Id. at 324.
162. The Court had applied the similar concept of "least drastic means" many times in other
fact contexts. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
163. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
164. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320 n.27.
2000] "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw" 217
c nditions of confinement would comport fully with the purpose[s] of
respondent's commitment."1 65 Other than this somewhat arcane refer-
ence, however, the source of the phrase is left unexplained. Although
Youngberg made it appear that "the federal courts seemed to be out of
the business of compelling states to create alternate treatment venues in
the community,"'' the abandonment of constitutional LRA language in
Youngberg actually had little practical impact on subsequent develop-
ments. 167 Other courts continued to adhere to that principle in cases in-
volving, for example, the right to refuse treatment,161 involuntary civil
commitment statutes, 16 and the right to sexual interaction. 170 In individ-
ual involuntary civil commitment matters, "most subsequent cases have
construed state statutes carefully, with most courts continuing to demand
relatively strict adherence to the appropriate statutory provisions."
1 71
C. The Impact of Riggins
This area of the law became more muddled after the Supreme
Court's 1992 decision in Riggins v. Nevada.172 The Riggins Court re-
versed a death sentence in the case of a competent insanity defense
pleader, who sought to refuse the administration of antipsychotic medi-
cations during the pendency of his trial.' 73 The Court found that the in-
voluntary medication was a violation of the defendant's right to a fair
trial.174 In Riggins, although the Court did not set down a bright line test
articulating the state's burden in sustaining forced drugging of a de-
tainee at trial, it found that this burden would be met had the state dem-
onstrated "medical appropriateness" and that either (1) in consideration
of less intrusive alternatives, forced drugging was "essential for the sake
of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others" or (2) there were not less
intrusive means by which to obtain an adjudication of the defendant's
guilt or innocence.' 75
165. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
166. Paul Appelbaum, Least Restrictive Alternative Revisited: Olmstead's Uncertain Mandate
for Community-Based Care, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1271, 1271 (1999).
167. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 3A-9.8, at 105.
168. E.g., Bee v. -reaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 974 (Colo. 1985). But cf Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266,
269 (3d Cir. 1983) (LRA analysis abandoned after Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg).
169. E.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1459 (1lth Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds
sub nom., Lynch v. Sessions, 942 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
170. E.g., Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 90-91 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
17i. I PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2C-5.3c, at 426-27.
172. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 3B-8.3, at 323-29 (discuss-
ing the issues left unresolved by Riggins and the varying interpretations by lower courts of the
Riggins decision).
173. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130-31.
174. Id. at 137.
175. Id. at 135-36.
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Riggins' use of "less intrusive alternatives" and "less intrusive
means"' 176 language in this context was especially surprising, as it ap-
peared to augur at least a partial constitutional resuscitation of the LRA
doctrine, in the context of a case (an insanity plea in a homicide)'7
that-at first blush-would appear to elicit far less sympathy with mem-
bers of the Rehnquist Court than the facts in Youngberg (a civil case
brought on behalf of a person with profound mental retardation who had
been victimized on numerous occasions while a resident of a state facil-
ity for persons with developmental disabilities), where it declined to
constitutionalize the LRA requirement. 78 Riggins gave new life to the
LRA doctrine, but it was not until the first generation of lower court
ADA litigation and the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C.79
that the doctrine appeared to regain new constitutional life and vitality.
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIEs ACT'
A. Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act has been hailed by advocates
for persons with disabilities as "[a] [b]reathtaking [p]romise, '''8' "the
most important civil rights act passed since 1964, ' '12 and the "Emanci-
pation Proclamation for those with disabilities.' 8 3 It is, without ques-
tion, Congress' most innovative attempt to address the pervasive prob-
lems of discrimination against citizens with physical and mental dis-
abilities' by providing, in the words of a congressional committee, "a
176. Id. at 135.
177. Id. at 129-3 1.
178. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 3 10-11.
179. 526 U.S. 581 (1999).
180. See Perlin, supra note 12; Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabili-
ties: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone? 8 J. L. & HEALTH 15 (1993-94); Michael L. Perlin, "Make
Promises by the Hour": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAuL L.
REV. 947 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Promises]. The material accompanying notes 181-94 infra is
generally adapted from Perlin, Promises, supra at 947-49.
181. Bonnie Milstein, Leonard Rubenstein, & Renee Cyr, The Americans With Disabilities
Act: A Breathtaking Promise for Persons with Mental Disabilities, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1240,1240 (1991).
182. Kent Jenkins, Jr., Spotlight Finds Hoyer, WASH. POST, May 28, 1990, at DI, col. 5, cited
in Kimberly Ackourey, Insuring Americans With Disabilities: How Far Can Congress Go To
Protect Traditional Practices?, 40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1183 n.1 (1991).
183. 4 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Summary and Analysis, Special Supplement
(BNA), at S-5, cited in Ackourey, supra note 182, at 1183 n.2 (statement by bill's sponsors). See
also, e.g., Sandra Law, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Burden on Business or
Dignity for the Disabled? 30 DUQ. L. REV. 99, 114 (1991) (calling the ADA a "solid and positive
step toward making this country a better nation").
184. PERLIN, supra note 1, § 6.44A, at 16 (1999 Cum. Supp.) (explaining that the ADA stands
as Congress's "most innovative attempt to address the pervasive problem of discrimination against
physically and mentally handicapped citizens").
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clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities."'185
The language that Congress chose to use in its introductory fact-
findings is of extraordinary importance. 186 Its specific finding that indi-
viduals with disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority. . sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness"' 1 7 is not just precatory flag-and-
apple-pie rhetoric.' This language-granted "the force of law"189-- was
carefully chosen;-it comes from the heralded "footnote 4" of the United
States v. Carolene Products19° case, which has served as the springboard
for nearly a half century of challenges to state and municipal laws that
have operated in discriminatory ways against other minorities. 91 The
language also reflects a congressional commitment to provide "protected
class" categorization for persons with disabilities.' 92 This in turn forces
185. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 1, at 3 (1990).
186. On the "shocking and eye-opening" nature of these findings, see Amy Lowndes, The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: A Congressional Mandate for Heightened Judicial Pro-
tection ofDisabled Persons, 44 FLA. L. REV. 417, 446 (1992).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
188. Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hoasp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1981) (citing the De-
velopmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 et seq. (1976), which
simply created a federal-state granting statute, and did not vest developmentally disabled indi-
viduals with a legally enforceable cause of action). This conclusion was criticized as "absurd" and
"objectionable" in an article co-authored by plaintiffs' lead counsel in the Pennhurst case. David
Ferleger & Patrice Maguire Scott, Rights and Dignity: Congress, the Supreme Court, and People
with Disabilities After Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 327, 350 (1983). For a survey of all
commentary, see 2 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 7.13 at 617-23. On the question of whether key sec-
tions of the ADA will be seen as little more than hortatory language, see Perlin, Promises supra
note 180, at 955; Perlin, supra note 12, at 16-17.
189. James Miller, The Disabled, the ADA, and Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 393,
413 (1994).
190. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
191. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. On the significance of the Carolene Products
language to the ADA, see Leonard Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health
Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 315, 339 (1996) (stating that
the ADA's invocation of Carolene Products footnote demonstrates justification for employing
"heightened judicial scrutiny" test); Susan Lee, Heller v. Doe: Involuntary Civil Commitment and
the 'Objective" Language of Probability, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 457, 467-68 n.90 (1994) (stating
that the language reflects congressional intent to identify disabled persons as group "deserving
heightened scrutiny"); Lisa Montanaro, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the Court Get
the Hint? Congress' Attempt to Raise the Status of Persons with Disabilities in Equal Protection
Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621, 663 (1995) (by adopting ADA, Congress attempted to utilize Caro-
lene Products theory to imply that a "heightened level of scrutiny" should be used in ADA cases).
192. Montanaro, supra note 191, at 663-64 (noting that Congress intended to transform dis-
abled into suspect class for purposes of constitutional and statutory interpretation); Lowndes,
supra note 186, at 446 ("Congress clearly intended to create a new protected class-the dis-
abled"). See also, e.g., Miller, supra note 189, at 412 (noting that Congress applied the "suspect
class" test in ADA statutory language); Phyllis Coleman & Ronald Shellow, Ask About Conduct
Not Mental Illness: A Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical Boards to Comply with the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act and Constitution, 20 J. LEGIS. 147, 151 n.23 (1994) ("the ADA treats
disabled persons as a suspect class").
In a trilogy of employment cases, the Supreme Court narrowed the category of persons who are
to be treated as "disabled" under the ADA. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 576 (1999); Albertsons, Inc v. Kirkingburg,
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courts to employ a "'compelling' state interest" or "strict scrutiny" test
in considering statutory and regulatory challenges to allegedly discrimi-
natory treatment. 193 The law's invocation of the full "sweep of congres-
sional authority, including the power to enforce the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment"' 194 simply means that any violation of the ADA must be
read in the same light as a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the
Constitution, guaranteeing-for the first time-that this core constitu-
tional protection will finally be made available to persons with disabili-
ties. 195
Individuals in inpatient psychiatric hospitals comprise a population
that is classically voiceless, friendless, and with few contacts in the free
world. It is a population whose disenfranchisement starkly mirrors the
sort of powerlessness and marginalization spoken to by the Supreme
Court in the Carolene Products case and, of course, spoken to by Con-
gress in the ADA's initial findings section.'96 Furthermore, forensic pa-
tients have always been the most powerless and marginalized of all psy-
chiatric inpatients.
197
527 U.S. 555 (1999). Nothing in these decisions, however, goes to the question of how the Court
would construe discrimination cases involving individuals found to be "disabled" within the
ADA's meaning. See Perlin, supra note 12 (manuscript at 18-22).
193. Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (D. Haw. 1994), rev'd., 81 F.3d 1480 (9th
Cir. 1996) (assuming application of strict scrutiny level in ADA cases); William Christian, Nor-
malization as a Goal: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Individuals with Mental Retarda-
tion, 73 TEx. L. REv. 409, 424 (1994) (stating that laws treating persons with disabilities differ-
ently should be subject to heightened scrutiny).
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Supreme Court ruled that mental retardation
was neither a suspect class nor a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. 473
U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985). In supporting its conclusion, it noted that a contrary decision would have
made it difficult to distinguish other groups such as persons with mental illness "who have per-
haps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the
desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the
public at large." Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 445.
194. 42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(4) (1994).
195. See, e.g., Timothy Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 434 (1991): ("[Congressional] findings indicate unambiguously that Con-
gress considered disability classifications to be just as serious and just as impermissible as racial
categorizations that are given 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny, sustainable by the courts only if
they are tailored to serve a 'compelling' governmental interest.")
Cook's article is cited approvingly in, inter alia, Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 308 (2d Cir.
1999); Kathleen S. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1998), stay
denied, 10 F. Supp. 2d 476 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Heather K. by Anita K. v. City of Mallard, Iowa, 887
F. Supp. 1249, 1263 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Valentine v. American Home Shield Corp., 939 F. Supp.,
1376, 1388 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1368 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Hut-
chinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 387 (N.D. Iowa 1995), and Muller v. Hotsy
Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1402 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
196. See Rubenstein, supra note 191, at 338-39, 350.
197. See, e.g., German & Singer, supra note 116, at 1074 ("No group of patients has been
more deprived of treatment, discriminated against, or mistreated than persons acquitted of crimes
on grounds of insanity.").
220
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B. Early Case Law
Early case law on the application of the ADA to the criminal process
in general and to forensic patients in particular has been skimpy.' 98 Idio-
syncratic cases have considered the application of the ADA to motions
seeking suppression of a criminal confession 199or seized evidence, 2°° to
the criminal plea bargaining process, 20' to a motion seeking to withdraw
a guilty plea,202 to the means used for transporting prisoners with dis-
abilitiesm to the revocation of alternative sentencing in sex offender
cases, 2 to probation revocations," 5 to the conduct of law enforcement
officers pursuant to arrests,2°6 and to the questioning of deaf arrestees. 207
But no coherent doctrinal threads could be found in a reading of this
universe of cases. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has found that
the ADA applies to state prisons.208 In Pennsylvania Department of Cor-
rections v. Yeskey, 209 the Court unanimously, per Justice Scalia, affirmed
a Third Circuit decision that allowed the plaintiff to maintain his suit
against the state department of corrections by alleging that he was de-
nied placement in a 'Motivational Boot Camp" first-offender program
because of his medical history of hypertension.210
The Court found that the ADA's language "unmistakably includes
198. See PERLIN, supra note 1, § 6.44A, at 62-76 (1999 Cum. Supp.).
199. People v. Gaylord, 621 N.Y.S.2d 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that non-
compliance with ADA is not basis for confession suppression); Patrice v. Murphy, 43 F. Supp. 2d
1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that Miranda warnings were adequately communicated through
the use of written materials).
200. People v. Long, 693 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding no ADA violation).
201. State v. Duford, 660 A.2d 736 (Vt. 1995) (finding no plain error where State failed to in-
stitute reasonable accommodation at plea bargain conference).
202. Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 876 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (rejecting defendant's argument
seeking to vacate plea).
203. Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding the ADA applicable to suits
seeking damages to recover for injuries that resulted from the means used to transport following
arrest). See also James Johnson, Does the Americans with Disabilities Act Apply to the Conduct of
Law Enforcement Officers Pursuant to Arrests? A Survey'ofGorman v. Bartch, 14 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 901 (1998).
204. State v. Dahl, 91 Wash. App. 1040 (1998) (holding that the ADA is inapplicable in these
situations) rev'd, 990 P.2d 396 (Wash. 1999).
205. Rodriguez v. State, No. 07-98-0135-CR, 1999 WL 94971 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1999)
(holding that ADA issues must be raised at trial level in order to be considered on appeal where
case involves revocation of probation).
206. Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no ADA violation
in arrest process); Foote v. Spiegel, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Utah 1999) (holding no ADA viola-
tion in arrest process because arrestee was not an individual with a disability).
207. Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D.N.J. 2000) (hold-
ing that the ADA prohibits discrimination against deaf persons in context of police station house
interviews).
208. See Michael L. Perlin, Hidden Agendas And Ripple Effects: Implications of Four Recent
Supreme Court Decisions For Forensic Mental Health Professionals, I J. FoRENSIC PSYCHOL.
PRAc. (forthcoming 2000).
209. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
210. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208.
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State prisons and prisoners within its coverage," noting that the law con-
tained no "exception that could cast the coverage of prisons into
doubt."21 In doing so, it rejected the state's argument, based on Gregory
v. Ashcrof,21 2 that federal courts should be loath, absent an "unmistaka-
bly clear" expression of Congress' intent, to "alter the 'usual constitu-
tional balance between the States and the Federal Government.' 21 3 Al-
though control over state prisons "may well be... a traditional and es-
sential state function,, 214 the explicit language of the ADA defeated the
215
state's Gregory-based argument.
The Court also rejected arguments by the state that state prison pro-
grams were not "benefits" under the ADA,21 6 that the phrase "qualified
individual with a disability ' 21 7 was ambiguous as to state prisoners (on
the theory that the statute's use of the words "eligibility" and "participa-
tion" implied a level of volutatariness that a prisoner could not meet),218
and that, because the statute's statement of findings did not specifically
mention prisons, the ADA should not apply to such facilities.21 9
Yeskey's erasure of any lingering doubt as to the application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to prisons also means that there can no
longer be any question as to the application of the ADA to all non-
federal institutions in which persons with physical or mental disabilities
(or those so perceived) reside.22 °
C. The Importance of Olmstead
These developments, however, were all a prelude to the Court's
1999 decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,221 which substantially affirmed a de-
211. Id. at 209.
212. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
213. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985)).
214. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209.
215. Id. at 208-09.
216. Id. at 210.
217. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994). This section provides that a "qualified individual with a
disability" is anyone who "with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or prac-
tices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services
or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." Id.
218. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210-11.
219. See id. at 211-12.
220. But see Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 120
S. Ct. 1265 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state's Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity in ADA). See generally Perlin, supra note 12; Perlin, supra note 14.
The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari in (and in late October 2000, heard oral argu-
ment in) Garrett v. University of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (1 1th Cir.
1999), cert. granted in part, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000) (states do not have Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity in.ADA cases). For a discussion of the oral argument in Garrett, see Tony
Mauro, High Court Weighs Whether ADA Applies to the States, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 12, 2000, at 1.
221. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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cision by the Eleventh Circuit that had provided the first coherent an-
swer to the question of the right of institutionalized persons with mental
disabilities to community services under the ADA.222 Plaintiffs L.C, and
E.W. had challenged their placement at Georgia Regional in Atlanta,
arguing that Title II of the ADA entitled them to "the most integrated
setting appropriate to [their] needs. ' 'm The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to plaintiffs, finding that the state's failure to place them
in an "appropriate community-based treatment program" so violated the
ADA, and the state appealed. 224 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the judgment that the state had discriminated against the plain-
tiffs, but also remanded "for further findings related to the State's de-
fense that the relief sought by plaintiffs would 'fundamentally alter the
natire of the service, program, or activity'. '2
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a split opinion per Justice Gins-
burg, qualifiedly affirmed. 2 6 After setting out the provisions of the
ADA that focused on the institutional segregation and isolation of per-
sons with disabilities, and the discrimination faced by persons with dis-
abilities (including "exclusion ...and segregation"), 227 the Court re-
viewed the key Department of Justice regulations, including the "inte-
gration" regulation, 22 pointing out that the case, as presented, did not
challenge their legitimacy.2 It then set out its holding:
We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision in substantial part.
Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly regarded as discrimi-
nation based on disability. But we recognize, as well, the States'
need to maintain a range of facilities for the care and treatment
of persons with diverse mental disabilities, and the States' obli-
gation to administer services with an even hand. Accordingly,
we further hold that the Court of Appeals' remand instruction
was unduly restrictive. In evaluating a State's fundamental-
222. L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893 (1 Ith Cir. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part & vacated in
part, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). See Perlin, supra note 12; PERLIN, supra note 23, at 191-204.
223. Olmstead, 138 F.3d at 895. Although both plaintiffs were transferred to community set-
tings prior to the court's decision, the court declined to find the case moot as such cases were
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 895 n.2. (citing, inter alia, Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 318-23 (1988)).
224. Id. at 895.
225. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(7) (2000)).
226. Id. at 587. Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Souter and Stevens (the latter in a separate opin-
ion) joined Justice Ginsburg in most of her opinion. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 582, 607-08. Justice
Stevens, who would have preferred to simply affirm the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, joined with
these four justices in all of the opinion save that portion that outlined the State's obligations in
such cases. Id. at 607-08. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, joined in part by Justice
Breyer. Id. at 608-15. Justice Thomas dissented for the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and himself.
Id. at 615-26.
227. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 591-92 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 121101 (a)(2), (3), (5) (1994)).
228. Id. at 592.
229. Id.
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alteration defense, the District Court must consider, in view of
the resources available to the State, not only the cost of provid-
ing community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of
services the State provides others with mental disabilities and
the State's obligation to mete out those services equitably.2
The Court endorsed the Department of Justice's position that "undue
institutionalization qualifies as discrimination 'by reason of... disabil-
ity,"'2 1 and then characterized the ADA as having "stepped up earlier
measures to secure opportunities for people with developmental disabili-
ties to enjoy the benefits of community living. ' '232 It stressed how much
more comprehensive the ADA was than "aspirational" or "hortatory"
laws such as the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act.233 It then focused on what it saw as congressional judgment
supporting the finding that "iinjustified institutional isolation of persons
with disabilities is a form of discrimination":
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and
benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted as-
sumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of
participating in community life. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 755 (1984) ('There can be no doubt that [stigmatizing in-
jury often caused by racial discrimination] is one of the most se-
rious consequences of discriminatory government action."); Los
Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707, n. 13 (1978) ("'In forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes."' (quoting Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971)). Sec-
ond, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the eve-
ryday life activities of individuals, including family relations,
social contacts, work options, economic independence, educa-
tional advancement, and cultural enrichment. See Brief for
American Psychiatric Association et al., as Amici Curiae 20-22.
Dissimilar treatment correspondingly exists in this key respect:
In order to receive needed medical services, persons with mental
disabilities must, because of those disabilities, relinquish par-
ticipation in community life they could enjoy given reasonable
accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can
receive the medical services they need without similar sacri-
230. Id. at 597.
231. Id. at 597.
232. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 599.
233. Id. (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976), as construed in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981)).
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fice.
2 34
The majority immediately clarified some qualifications in its opin-
ion. It emphasized that the ADA did not "condone[ termination of
institutional settings for persons unable to handle or benefit from
community settings," 235 the states "generally may rely on the reasonable
assessments of its own professionals" in determining whether an
individual is eligible for community-based programs, 6 and there was
no requirement that "community-based treatment be imposed on patients
who do not desire it.",37 None of these issues, however, were present in
the case before it: Georgia's professionals determined that community-
based treatment would be appropriate for the plaintiffs, both of whom
desired such treatment.28 The Court added one additional word of
caution here:
We do not in this opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the
States a "standard of care" for whatever medical services they
render, or that the ADA requires States to "provide a certain
level of benefits to individuals with disabilities." . . . We do
hold, however, that States must adhere to the ADA's nondis-
crimination requirement with regard to the services they in fact
provide.29
The ADA, it concluded, "is not reasonably read to . . . phase out
institutions, placing patients in need of close care at risk," nor is the
law's mission "to drive States to move institutionalized patients into an
inappropriate setting, such as a homeless shelter."24° For some patients,
"no placement outside the institution may ever be appropriate."241 Be-
cause of these factors, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the state must
have more leeway than offered by the Eleventh Circuit's remedy:
If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a com-
prehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified per-
sons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a
waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the
234. Id. at 600-01. See Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae 6-7, 17.
235. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601-02.
236. Id. at 602.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 602-03.
239. Id. at 603 n.14.
240. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604-605. At one point, Georgia had proposed such a placement for
one ofthe named plaintiffs, and then later retracted it. Id. at 605.
241. Id. at 605. On this point, the opinion cited, inter alia, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982): "For many mentally retarded people, the differ-
ence between the capacity to do things for themselves within an institution and total dependence
on the institution for all of their needs is as much liberty as they ever will know." Id.
2000]
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State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the
reasonable-modifications standard would be met.24
She summarized in this way:
Under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide com-
munity-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities
when the State's treatment professionals determine that such
placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose
such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommo-
dated, taking into account the resources available to the State
and the needs of others with mental disabilities .243
IV. SANISM AND PRETEXTUALITY
Earlier, I alluded to the impact of sanism and pretextuality on devel-
opments in this area. 244 Simply put, "sanism" is an irrational prejudice of
242. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06.
243. Id. at 607.
Justice Stevens concurred, stating that he would have preferred simply affirming the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion, but, because there were not five votes for that disposition, he joined in all of
Justice Ginsburg's opinion, except for the remedy-enforcement portion. Id. at 607-08. Justice
Kennedy concurred, urging "caution and circumspection" in the enforcement of the Olmstead
case. Id. at 610. After stressing that persons with mental disabilities "have been subject to historic
mistreatment, indifference, and hostility," he traced what he saw as the history of deinstitutionali-
zation: that, while it has permitted "a substantial number of mentally disabled persons to receive
needed treatment with greater freedom and dignity," it has "ha[d] its dark side" as well. Id. at 608-
09. It would be a "tragic event," Justice Kennedy warned, if states read the ADA-as construed in
Olmstead-in such a way as to create an incentive to states, "for fear of litigation, to drive those
in need of medical care and treatment out of appropriate care and into settings with too little
assistance and supervision," Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 610, and he thus emphasized that opinions of
"a responsible treating physician" should be "given the greatest of deference." Id. He again urged
"caution and circumspection" and "great deference to the medical decisions of the responsible,
treating physicians." Id. Justice Breyer joined in this portion of Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
Finally, he parted company from Justice Ginsburg on the weight she gave to the congressional
findings. The findings in question, he concluded, "do not show that segregation and institutionali-
zation are always discriminatory or that segregation or institutionalization are, by their nature,
forms of prohibited discrimination." Id. at 614. Instead, he reasoned, "they underscore Congress'
concern that discrimination has been a frequent and pervasive problem in institutional settings and
policies and its concern that segregating disabled persons from others can be discriminatory." Id.
at 614.
Justice Thomas dissented, criticizing the majority opinion for interpreting "discrimination" to
"encompass [] disparate treatment among members of the same protected class." Olmstead, 527
U.S. at 616. He argued that the congressional findings on which the majority premised its conclu-
sions were "vague" and written in "general hortatory terms." Id. at 620-21. He further argued that
the majority's approach imposed "significant federalism costs" and warned that states "will now
be forced to defend themselves in federal court every time resources prevent the immediate
placement ofa qualified individual." Id. at 624-25. He concluded:
Continued institutional treatment of persons who, though now deemed treatable in a
community placement, must wait their turn for placement, does not establish that
the denial of community placement occurred 'by reason of" their disability. Rather,
it establishes no more than the fact that petitioners have limited resources.
Id. at 626.
244. See generally Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 25 (exploring the relationships among
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the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause
(and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, ho-
mophobia and ethnic bigotry.245 It infects both our jurisprudence and our
lawyoring practices.2m Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially
acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, supersti-
tion and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use
of alleged "ordinary common sense" ("OCS") and heuristic reasoning in
an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal
process.~7
"Pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or explic-
itly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (fre-
quently meretricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses,
especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends."2' This pretextuality is
poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cyni-
cism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces
shoddy lawyering, blas6 judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt
testifying. 9
In a series of recent articles and a new book, I have sought to dem-
onstrate that mental disability law is sanist and pretextual, no matter
whether the topic in question is involuntary civil commitment law, insti-
tutional rights law, the right to sexual interaction, the insanity defense,
competency to plead guilty or waive counsel, or the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 25° In the final part of this Article, I will expand this inquiry
sanism, pretextuality, and therapeutic jurisprudence).
245. The classic treatment is GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1955). For an
important new, and different, perspective, see ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF
PREJUDICE (1996). See generally PERLIN, supra note 23, ch. 2 (discussing roots of sanism and the
relationship between sanism and other "ismic" behavior, such as racism or sexism or homopho-
bia).
246. The phrase "sanism" was probably coined by Dr. Morton Birnbaum. See Morton Birn-
baum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960) (cited at Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761,
764 (2d Cir. 1978)); see also Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Home-
lessness: A Story ofMarginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REv. 63, 92-93 (1991) (discussing Birnbaum's
insights).
247. See generally PERUIN, supra note 23, at 21-58.
248. Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality. Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Com-
mon Sense, "Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 131, 135 (1991); see also Charles Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839, 840 (1974).
249. See generally PERLiN, supra note 23, at 59-75.
250. See generally PERLIN, supra note 23; Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 25; see also Mi-
chael L Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally
Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption? 1 PS YcHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 80
(1995); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than "Dodging Lions and Wastin'
Time"? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual
Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 114 (1996); Michael L. Perlin,
Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993); Michael L.
Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier? 20
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOc. CHANGE 302 (1993-94); Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First To
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to the question before us: are policies governing incompetency and in-
sanity evaluations and placements sanist and pretextual as well?
V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can
assess the ultimate impact of case law and legislation that affects men-
tally disabled individuals, studying the role of the law as a therapeutic
agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers'
roles may have either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences, and
questioning whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be
reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordi-
nating due process principles. 25'
Recent therapeutic jurisprudence articles and essays have thus con-
sidered such matters as the insanity acquittee conditional release hear-
ing, health care of mentally disabled prisoners, the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, incompetency labeling, competency decision-making,
juror decision-making in malpractice and negligent release litigation,
competency to consent to treatment, competency to seek voluntary
treatment, standards of psychotherapeutic tort liability, the effect of
guilty pleas in sex offender cases, correctional law, health care delivery,
"repressed memory" litigation, the impact of scientific discovery on
substantive criminal law doctrine, and the competency to be executed. 2
I have weighed the therapeutic jurisprudence implications of much of
mental disability law253 and, again, in the final section of this Article,
will consider those implications for the question I am here addressing.
VI. THE IMPACT OF OLMSTEAD ON INCOMPETENCY AND INSANITY LAW
Before Olmstead, a smattering of case law applied LRA principles to
cases concerning the conditions of confinement of defendants found not
guilty by reason of insanity, 254 but the courts were silent on cases in-
Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defen-
dants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1996); Perlin, Myths, supra note 101; Perlin, Deconstructing,
supra note 101; Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental
Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431 (1995).
251. See generally supra note 24 (providing relevant materials for therapeutic jurisprudence).
252. See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2D-3, at 535-40 nn.83-132.
253. For my most recent inquiries see Perlin, Healing, supra note 25 and PERLIN, supra note
23, at 261-72.
254. See State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 108 (Wis. 1995) (noting that insanity acquittees,
unlike other involuntarily committed persons, do not have right, under prior version of patients'
rights statute, to confinement in least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve purposes of their
commitment); People v. Cross, 704 N.E.2d 766, 771(11. App. Ct. 1998) (reasoning that the re-
quirement under corrections law that insanity acquittee be held in secure setting governed over
requirement under Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code that person involuntarily
committed be held in the least restrictive environment possible); McSwain v. Stricklin, 540 So. 2d
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volving incompetency to stand trial and insanity evaluations and place-
ment of defendants found permanently incompetent under Jackson. 5
Commentators such as Professor Winick have long urged the application
of these principles to incompetency cases, 256 but courts have never re-
sponded.27 And the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hen-
dricks2 8 -upholding the constitutionality of Kansas' "sexually violent
predator act"2 9-- made it appear as if "the Supreme Court is comfortable
with a statutory scheme that has the potential of transforming psychiat-
ric treatment facilities into de facto prisons and that uses mental health
treatment as a form of social control,"' ' 0 a position that would appear to
make any movement toward an application of LRA principles in any
forensic cases even less likely. All of this, of course, preceded Olm-
stead.
The question is thus cast: what impact does Olmstead-specifically
using "less restrictive settings" language-have on the ways that incom-
petency, insanity evaluations, and commitments are conducted and or-
dered?
81, 84 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (citing the trial court's finding that continued placement in secure
medical facility was least restrictive means of treating schizophrenia of defendant who had been
found not guilty by reason of insanity was sufficiently supported by evidence, even though that
defendant's schizophrenia could currently be controlled through use of drug); Brown v. United
States, 682 A.2d 1131, 1137 (D.C. 1996) (holding that a "[h]ospital is obligated to follow the least
restrictive form of treatment" if the court has ordered the civil commitment of a mental patient,
but if the committee is acquitted, "[t]he nature of the acquittee's treatment while confined may be
relevant to the level of custody... it is to be weighed in the context of affording reasonable as-
surances of public safety.") Cf. State v. Kinman, 671 N.E.2d 1083, 1084 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(arguing that the state bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence which commit-
ment alternative is least restrictive at initial determination of whether insanity acquittee should be
involuntarily committed); Schuttemeyer v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Ky. CL App.
1990), reh'g denied (1990), and discret rev. denied. (1990) (holding that evidence would not
permit finding that hospitalization was least restrictive alternative mode of treatment for defen-
dant found not guilty by reason of insanity, so as to support involuntary hospitalization; testifying
psychologist unequivocally stated that involuntary hospitalization was not necessary). See also,
e.g., supra note 154.
255. Courts have, on the other hand, employed the LRA principle in their resolution of cases
involving incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants in a situation beyond the scope of this Article: the
right of such defendants to refuse antipsychotic medication so as to make them competent to stand
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998); see Michael L. Perlin, Are
Courts Competent to Decide Questions of Competency? Stripping the Facade From United States
v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957 (1990); Bruce Winick, Coercion and Mental Health Treat-
ment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1145 (1997).
256. See supra note 137. Cf Erika King, Outpatient Civil Commitment in North Carolina:
Constitutional and Policy Concerns, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 250, 267 n.100 (1995) ("[A]
mentally ill but easily curable criminal defendant committed (pending trial) on a finding of in-
competence might successfully argue that the Jackson rule mandated precisely that treatment
necessary to restore his competence").
257. Courts have been reluctant to broaden the rights of incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants
in other contexts as well. See, e.g., People v. Fox, 669 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1997) (stat-
ing that such defendants are neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class for equal protection pur-
poses in the grand jury selection process).
258. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
259. See generally Perlin, supra note 15 (criticizing decision in Kansas v. Hendricks).
260. 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 2A-3.3, at 90.
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There has been astonishingly little literature on the impact of Olm-
stead on the future of the LRA doctrine. 261 Most optimistic of the early
commentators has been John Parry, editor of the MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER. Concluded Parry:
Of all the ADA Supreme Court decisions this term, Olmstead is
the most significant for several reasons. Fundamentally, it ex-
pands the possibilities for persons in state-run mental institu-
tions. Until Olmstead, the Court was suspicious of any kind of
constitutionally based right to services in the community or least
restrictive setting. In the past, the foundation of deinstitutionali-
zation was the absence of dangerousness to self or others, not
the appropriateness of treatment or essential services in non-
institutional settings. ... The ADA's integration of service man-
date, however, presented a new opportunity for advocates to ob-
tain appropriate community-based services from the states, but
many states argued that Title II did not obligate them to provide
such services. Now that obligation is beyond dispute.262
In addition, a student commentator noted how Olmstead showed a "clear
preference, in the civil rights context, for care in the least restrictive
environment. "263.On the other hand, writing soon after the decision, Pro-
fessor Paul Appelbaum speculated as to whether the initial "ecstatic"
response of mental disability advocates was premature, and concluded:
[I]t is unclear to what extent the U.S. Supreme Court will sup-
port lower courts in compelling states to create community al-
ternatives that do not now exist. No bright line has been identi-
fied to separate states that can rely on the fundamental-alteration
defense from those that cannot. The reluctance of the courts to
trample on executive branch prerogatives has always been the
bugaboo of the least restrictive alternative doctrine. Whatever
else it may accomplish, the decision in Olmstead v. L.C. is un-
likely to precipitate the widespread creation of community-based
264
services for persons with mental disabilities.
261. I consider this gt greater length in Perlin, supra note 14.
262. John Parry, The Supreme Court Interprets the ADA, 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 454, 456 (1999) (citations omitted).
263. Sarah Light, Rejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the Mentally
Disabled Under Tort Law, 109 YALE LJ. 381, 391 (1999).
264. Appelbaum, supra note 166, at 1272. Cf. Note, Leading Cases: Federal Statutes, Regula-
tions, and Treaties, 113 HARv. L. REv. 326 (1999):
In Youngberg, the Court held that, in assessing the constitutionality of the use of re-
straints in mental institutions, the decision to use restraints, "if made by a profes-
sional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by
the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judg-
ment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually
did not base the decision on such a judgment." Although the Court in Olmstead
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And certainly, the fear of tort-based litigation-litigation that favors a
policy of erring on the side of over-confinement 5 --must be juxtaposed
against any LRA preference suggested in Olmstead.
In the months since Olmstead was decided, there have been re-
markably few cases relying upon it. Lower federal courts and state
courts have cited Olmstead for the proposition that "the ADA in fact
prohibits segregation of persons with disabilities and requires states to
make reasonable efforts to place institutionalized individuals with dis-
abilities into the community" 266 in the "most integrated setting to fit
their needs"267 and have quoted its language that the ADA provides "a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities." 268 But there are as of
yet no cases that seriously reconceptualize the LRA doctrine after Olm-
stead.
The ADA's "community integration" mandate is silent on forensic
issues. The Supreme Court made it clear in Yeskey that the ADA applies
to state prisons,269 and lower courts have weighed the application of the
ADA to a host of issues related to the criminal process (both trial and
pro-trial).270 None of these cases, though, addresses the issue that I am
tackling in this Article: Does Olmstead's interpretation of the ADA's
employment of the LRA test require a recalibration of our policies gov-
erning incompetency-to-stand-trial and insanity evaluations and com-
mitments? Only one pre-Olmstead case has ever considered these issues
on the merits: there, a federal district court found that an involuntarily
committed insanity acquittee did not raise valid claims that the state's
denial of outpatient treatment violated the ADA. 27 At least two pre-
Olmstead cases brought under the Federal Fair Housing Act Amend-
ments of 1988, argued-successfully-that the exclusion of insanity
avoided citing Youngberg, its deference to professional judgment seemed to invoke
the spirit of Youngberg. In the wake of Olmstead and its explicit deference to pro-
fessional judgment, institutions may simply avoid complying with the ADA by cre-
ating cultures in which recommendations for patient community treatment are few
and far between.
Id. at 332-33.
265. Light, supra note 263, at 392.
266. Rolland v. Cellucci, 191 F.R.D. 3, 9 (D. Mass. 2000).
267. Kathleen S. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, No. 97-6610, 1999 WL 1257284, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 23, 1999).
268. Kirbens v. Wyoming St. Bd. of Med., 992 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Wyo. 1999).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 208-18.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 199-207.
271. Greist v. Norristown State Hosp., No. CIV-A-96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 16, 1997), aff'd o.b., 156 F.3d 1224 (3d Cir. 1998) and cert. denied., 525 U.S. 1057 (1998).
See also Neiberger v. Hawkins, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding that ADA prohibi-
tion on discrimination against disabled persons by a public entity did not apply to suit against
state officials in their personal capacities).
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acquittees from congregate living facilities in the community violated
that law,2  but neither invoked the ADA.2' 3
One post-Olmstead case-an ADA challenge to a long-term disabil-
ity insurance program274 -offers some insights that may be moderately
helpful. In the course of its decision denying the defendants' motion to
dismiss, the district court carefully read Olmstead's rejection of the ar-
gument that disparate treatment of different members of a protected
class is not discrimination.275 Concluded the trial court: "It logically
follows that the ADA is violated by a policy that disadvantages schizo-
phrenics based on their disability, despite the fact that individuals con-
fined to wheelchairs are benefited., 276 This argument could be used to
support the position that a policy that discriminates against persons with
mental disabilities who are treated as forensic patients in comparison to
those who are treated as civil patients similarly violates the ADA.2" In
the months since Olmstead was decided, however, this is the only re-
ported case that is remotely relevant to the issue at hand.278
Olmstead mandates a change in our "business as usual" means of
dealing with the populations in question. Under Olmstead, policies that
require the automatic (or de jure) commitment of all incompetency and
insanity pleaders to maximum security facilities-notwithstanding the
nature of the charge or the individual dangerousness of the defendant-
potentially violate the ADA, in part, at least, because of their explicit
and implicit lack of individualization. After Olmstead, individualized
determinations must be made in each case as to whether or not such
maximum security institutionalization is necessary-whether the case
involves an evaluation of an incompetency or insanity pleader, the
placement of a defendant permanently incompetent under Jackson, or a
"successful" insanity acquittee. Certainly, a significant number of indi-
viduals in each of these categories could be treated in settings less re-
272. See Township of West Orange v. Whitman, 8 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D.N.J. 1998); Commit-
ment ofJ.W., 672 A.2d 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1996).
273. More typical ofpre-Olmstead cases is Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 1024 (1998) (failing to cite the ADA, the court held that a statute denying social
security benefits to institutionalized NGRI acquittees but providing them to patients institutional-
ized following involuntary civil commitment did not violate the equal protection clause) (ADA
not cited).
274. Boots v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.N.H. 1999).
275. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 588 n.10.
276. Boots, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
277. Although it may be argued that Yeskey is distinguishable in that it deals with a prisoner's
right to not be deprived of a placement entitlement because of his disability (as opposed to a
forensic patient's right to a specific locus for an evaluation or commitment), I believe that the
Olmstead-based argument relied upon successfully in Boots compels the conclusion that Yeskey is
equally applicable here. My thanks again to Grant Morris for calling my attention to this issue.
278. Cf Matter of Sanon v. Wing, No. 403296/98, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 139 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2000) (finding that Olmstead forbids New York City and state officials from denying
person with disability access to public benefit).
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stricfive than the state's maximum security forensic facility, and Olin-
stead suggests that it is no longer permissible under federal law to con-
tinue the former policies.
Olmstead makes clear that "unjustified isolation" is "properly re-
garded as discrimination based on disability,"27 and "undue institution-
alization qualifies as discrimination 'by reason of ... disability."' '2 It
further explains that institutional placement of those who can "handle
and benefit" from community settings "perpetuates unwarranted
assumptions that [such isolated] persons ... are incapable or unworthy
of participating in community life,",28' institutional confinement
"severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals,"2 2 and
that states must have operative "working" plans "for placing qualified
persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings." 283 Nothing
in Olmstead suggests that these holdings are limited to civil patients.
The evidence appears clear that reliance on maximum security facili-
ties for incompetency evaluations in misdemeanor and petty crime cases
is unnecessary and counterproductive, highly stigmatizing, unduly ex-
pensive, and an impediment to the investigation of cases in preparation
for trial.2 4 It is also clear that many states-perhaps most-have been
derelict in the implementation of Jackson v. Indiana, that maximum se-
curity hospitalization is the disposition of almost all Jackson cases, and
that nearly half of all trial judges believe that such disposition is manda-
tory. 2 5 Similarly, it is clear that insanity evaluations-again, in most
instances, regardless of the underlying charge or the defendant's
dangerousness-are generally done in such facilities, and that state stat-
utes often specify that such settings be "secure. '286 And, the politics of
the insanity defense makes it similarly inevitable that defendants who
are found "not guilty by reason of insanity" will most likely be housed
in maximum security settings, often for far longer than the maximum
sentence that they could have received had they been convicted of the
underlying offense.287
Olmstead requires us to rethink these policies and begin to seriously
question the constitutionality of statutes, rules and court decisions that
have endorsed the current state of affairs. I recognize that this position
may well be a controversial one and may be opposed by some of those
who typically argue that the civil rights and civil liberties of civilly in-
279. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 600.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 606.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82 & 90-93.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 110-17.
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stitutionalized persons with disabilities should be maximized. As I noted
in the introduction to this Article, I understand that many advocates may
be concerned that application of Olmstead principles to a forensic popu-
lation may fuse in the public's mind images of the civilly and the crimi-
nally committed, and that this fusion may potentially be exploited by
those who seek to minimize the rights of all persons with mental dis-
abilities. Although this possibility certainly troubles me, I do not believe
that the inchoate fear expressed should lead us to abandon our commit-
ment to a universe that includes some of the most despised and mis-
treated of all persons with disabilities: the universe of forensic patients.
VII. SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, AND
"MISDEMEANOR OUTLAWS"
I also believe that the current policies that I have been discussing are
sanist and pretextual, and that a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis will
demonstrate that they are anti-therapeutic as well.
A. Sanism
Underlying this entire area of the law is the assumption that indi-
viduals who plead incompetency and insanity are somehow more dan-
gerous than other persons with mental illness (and, indeed, more dan-
gerous than other criminal defendants who do not raise mental status
defenses).2 8' That assumption-one that is premised on an implicit pol-
icy of non-individualization-is a sanist one. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Jones v. United States289 resonates with sanism, making, as it
does, "a presumed absolute linkage between mental illness and
dangerousness,,290 and arguing-there is no other descriptor for this part
of the opinion but "absurdly"-that "larceny is usually less violent than
murder or assault."29'
Our insanity defense and incompetency-to-stand-trial jurisprudences
are riddled with examples of sanism. Think of some of these myths that
permeate case law, statutes, and practice:
- reliance on a fixed vision of popular, concrete, visual images
288. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 31, at 109 (noting that defendants who asserted an insanity
defense at trial and were ultimately found guilty served significantly longer sentences than defen-
dants tried on similar charges who did not assert the insanity defense); see also, Winick, supra
note 3, at 580-81 (noting that defendants evaluated for incompetency confined longer than had
they either pled guilty or been convicted at trial without having raised the question oftheir mental
status)
289. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
290. PERLIN, supra note 31, at 389.
291. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.14 (1983) (emphasis added).
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of craziness;
- an obsessive fear of feigned mental states;
- sanctioning of the death penalty in the case of mentally re-
tarded defendants, some defendants who are "substantially men-
tally impaired," or defendants who have been found guilty but
mentally ill (GBMI);
- the incessant confusion and conflation of substantive mental
status tests; and
- the regularity of sanist appeals by prosecutors in insanity de-
fense summations, arguing that insanity defenses are easily
faked, that insanity acquittees are often immediately released,
and that expert witnesses are readily duped.292
Myths such as these, which rely irrationally on behavioral stereo-
types and employ distorted heuristic cognitive devices,m help explain
why the insanity defense evaluation and commitment systems have de-
veloped as they have. We fear and despise defendants who raise the in-
sanity defense-at least one survey has demonstrated that our feelings
are constant whether we perceive the defense as real or feigned94--and
we punish them for daring to plead that they are not responsible. We
assume they are the most dangerous of all criminal defendants, even
when the underlying charge.is as petty as attempted larceny. The current
practice-a practice that must be reconsidered in light of Olmstead-can
easily be described as sanism per se.
Sanism similarly infects incompetency-to-stand-trial jurisprudence
in at least four critical ways:
(1) courts resolutely adhere to the conviction that defendants
regularly malinger and feign incompetency; (2) courts stub-
bornly refuse to understand the distinction between incompe-
tency to stand trial and insanity, even though the two statuses
involve different concepts, different standards, and different
points on the "time line"; (3) courts misunderstand the relation-
ship between incompetency and subsequent commitment, and
fail to- consider the lack of a necessary connection between
post-determination institutionalization and appropriate treat-
ment; and (4) courts regularly accept patently inadequate expert
292. Perlin, supra note 99, at 1422.
293. PERLIN, supra note 31, at 390. On heuristics in this context in general, see Perlin, supra
note 100, Perlin, supra note 255, and PERLIN, supra note 23, at 3-20.
294. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 781 (La. 1992) (Cole, J., dissenting) ("Society has the
right to protect itself from those who would commit murder and seek to avoid their legitimate
punishment by a subsequently contracted, or feigned, insanity."); Gilbert Geis & Robert F. Meier,
Abolition of the Insanity Plea in Idaho: A Case Study, 477 .ANNALS 72, 73 (1985) (explaining that
Idaho residents hold view that persons should not be able to avoid punitive consequences of
criminal acts by reliance on "either a real or a faked plea of insanity").
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testimony in incompetency to stand trial cases.29'
The failure of the states to implement Jackson, the failure of trial
judges to learn that there are alternatives other than maximum security
facilities to which they may order defendants for incompetency evalua-
tions, the failure of policymakers to remediate the "shuttle" system
through which defendants are sent endlessly from security hospital to
jail and back, and the failure of the legal system to inquire as to whether
the treatment received by defendants through these processes is even
appropriate all reflect sanism in this aspect of criminal procedure.
Again, Olmstead forces us to rethink the impact of these acts.
B. Pretextuality
Many of these sanist acts are also pretextual. The failure of over half
the states to implement the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Jackson v.
Indiana is a textbook example of pretextuality.296 The political decision-
making in insanity acquittal cases-best exemplified by the NIMH Re-
port conceding that individual release decisions are made in accordance
with political dictates in "controversial cases" 297-demonstrates the pre-
textuality that drives this area of jurisprudence.
In a recent article on the insanity defense, I made this link between
insanity defense jurisprudence and pretextuality:
Indeed, all aspects of the judicial decisionmaking process em-
body pretextuality. [T]he fear that defendants will fake the in-
sanity defense to escape punishment continues to paralyze the
legal system in spite of an impressive array of empirical evi-
dence that reveals (1) the minuscule number of such cases, (2)
the ease with which trained clinicians are usually able to catch
malingering in such cases, (3) the inverse greater likelihood that
defendants, even at grave peril to their life, will be more likely
to try to convince examiners that they're not crazy, (4) the high
risk in pleading the insanity defense (leading to statistically sig-
nificant greater prison terms meted out to unsuccessful insanity
pleaders), and (5) that most successful insanity pleaders remain
in maximum security facilities for a far greater length of time
than they would have had they been convicted on the underlying
criminal indictment. In short, pretextuality dominates insanity
defense decisionmaking. The inability of judges to disregard
public opinion and inquire into whether defendants have had fair
295. Perlin, supra note 80, at 678.
296. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 3, at 927; Morris & Meloy, supra note 81, at 9-12; Perlin,
Half-wracked, supra note 25, at 23-24.
297. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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trials is both the root and the cause of pretextuality in insanity
defense jurisprudence. m
Again, a careful reading of the Olmstead case calls into question the
pretextual way we have conducted insanity defense "business as usual."
C. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
What about therapeutic jurisprudence? It is clear to me that the cur-
rent system is anti-therapeutic. The indiscriminate use of maximum se-
curity for the vast majority of insanity and incompetency evaluations-
no matter what the charge or the perceived degree of dangerousness of
the individual defendant-as well as for those defendants found perma-
nently incompetent or NGRI results in unnecessarily lengthy stays in
settings that often are anti-therapeutic by the very nature of their prison-
like conditions and their focus on custody and security at the expense of
individualized treatment rights. In such facilities-many of which have
been the target of class-action or law-reform conditions litigation - ---
patients typically have had less access to family visits, attorney contacts,
and alternative therapeutic modalities, 30 and frequently are ineligible
(or certainly, less eligible) for work-release programs, placement in
halfway houses, or other such less restrictive alternatives.0 1 It is likely
that they are even more stigmatized by being housed in such a facility.3 2
The anti-therapeutic impact of such conditions should be clear.
David Wexler has written extensively about the anti-therapeutic na-
ture of the current insanity acquittee system, and has drawn on the
works of Donald Meichenbaum and Dennis Turk in a search for a strat-
egy that would significantly increase patient treatment adherence in this
context.3 3 Bruce Winick has similarly written extensively about the
anti-therapeutic impact of incompetency labeling and of an incompe-
tency system whose hallmarks are maximum security and delay.3° In an
earlier piece, I suggested a link between the ADA and therapeutic juris-
298. Perlin, supra note 99, at 1423.
299. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d
Cir. 1981); Davis v. Armistead, 575 F. Supp. 695 (M.D. La. 1983); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.
Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
300. See Winick, supra note 3, at 942; STEADMAN, supra note 32, at 8-9.
301. See, e.g., Harman v. United States, 718 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1998) (finding an insanity acquit-
tee ineligible for work release or furlough program); cf People v. Nelson, 614 N.E.2d 277 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (ordering halfway house placement over state's objections).
302. See generally Bruce Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Compe-
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prudence. I argued that "the actual application of the ADA to these key
areas of patients' civil rights law might result in the total transformation
of these areas of the law, and might do so in ways that combat sanism,
expose pretextuality, and provide a building block of therapeutic juris-
prudence."3°5
The use of the ADA as a tool on behalf of the populations that were
the subject of Wexler and Winick's therapeutic jurisprudence inquiries
is an important step toward confronting the sanism and pretextuality that
continue to dominate this area of the law. And Olmstead is-as of this
date-the best vehicle to be used to this end.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Chimes of Freedom, Bob Dylan identifies explicitly with The
Other--"the deaf, the blind the mute/ . . . the mistreated, .mateless
mother, the mistitled prostitute/... the misdemeanor outlaw, chased an'
cheated by pursuit., 30 7 In footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case-the
inspiration for the findings that gave the ADA its spiritual strength and
much of its constitutional muscle 308-Congress gives special status to
persons with disabilities as a "discrete and insular minority . . . sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness.,, 309 The unconscious parallels be-
tween the two descriptions are astounding.
For decades, mentally disabled criminal defendants who have raised
mental status defenses have been "deprived of treatment, discriminated
against [and] mistreated., 310 Although they have perhaps now been sup-
planted by convicted sex offenders as the "most despised" group in soci-
305. Perlin, Promises, supra note 180, at 956-57. The link between the ADA and therapeutic
jurisprudence is also made explicit in Deborah A. Dorfman, Effectively Implementing Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act for Mentally Disabled Persons: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Analysis, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 105 (1993-94), in Rose Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accom-
modations Through Co-worker Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality
Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act., 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89 (1993-94), and in T. How-
ard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration of Persons with Severe Mental Disorders:
Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283 (1997).
306. See SANDER L. GiLMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY,
RACE AND MADNESS 130 (1985); Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Border-
line" Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them." 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV.
775, 787 (1998):
[W]e are doing two things: we are distancing ourselves from mentally disabled per-
sons-the "them"-and we are simultaneously trying to construct an impregnable
borderline between "us" and "them," both to protect ourselves and to dehumanize
what Sander Gilman calls "the Other." The label of "sickness" reassures us that "the
Other"-seen as "both ill and infectious, both damaged and damaging" not like us
and further animates our "keen... desire to separate 'us' and 'them'."
307. DYLAN, supra note 28, at 132.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 186-95; Perlin, Promises, supra note 180, at 949.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
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"For the Misdemeanor Outlaw"
ety, 311 little else has changed. Judges ignore Supreme Court rulings, mis-
comprehend the relevant law (usually with impunity), and decide cases
based on political fears. Although respected commentators have called
our attention to this state of affairs for years, little has changed. The
Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead, though, may force us to
reconceptualize our policies and make us think carefully and deliber-
ately about the implications of the ADA and the LRA doctrine for foren-
sic populations in general, and, specifically, for "the misdemeanor out-
law."
In the final verse of Chimes of Freedom, Dylan invokes his fantastic
images of the chimes "tolling for the aching ones whose wounds cannot
be nursed/For the countless confused, accused, misused, strung-out ones
an' worse."312 Perhaps the ADA-through the majority opinion in Olin-
stead-will finally allow the "chimes of freedom" to flash for one and
all.
311. See Perlin, supra note 15, at 1248.
312. DYLAN, supra note 28, at 133.
20001

